



2012 March Tornado Activation

March 2, 2012

**AFTER ACTION
REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

September 11, 2012

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ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 2, 2012 at approximately 3:09 pm, tornadoes struck Clark County, Indiana. The National Weather Service (NWS) in Louisville provided an EF-4 rating of the tornado, with winds in excess of 175 mph. The tornado first entered Clark County at the Washington County – Clark County line just east of South Flatwood Road, and departed the county at the Scott County line just east of Nabb, located on State Highway 362. The tornado path was 17.0 miles across the county and almost a half-mile wide.

The tornado moved into far southeast Washington County before reappearing in Clark County. In Clark, the damage width narrowed to one-quarter mile as the tornado crossed Pixley Knob Road and decreased in intensity to EF2 with wind speeds of 115-120 mph.

Further east, the tornado intensified again as it destroyed two double wide homes on Speith Road. One family residence on the west side of the road was severely damaged, reflecting EF3 damage with 150 mph winds.

The tornado continued to strengthen just east of Exit 19 off Interstate 65 in a heavily industrialized area. Buildings containing several businesses were severely damaged. The violent tornado seriously damaged several homes on the north side of State Highway 160. Here, there was evidence of multi-vortex structure with EF4 damage and 175 mph estimated winds.

The tornado then struck the south buildings of the Henryville middle and high school complex, with severe damage and 170 mph winds (EF4). Two school buses were ripped off their chassis. There was extensive structural damage on the east side of Henryville. A high tension tower and other homes were damaged. Incredible tree damage also occurred just west of Pine Drive as the tornado traveled up a ridge. In this region, the tornado was an EF3 with 150 mph winds.

On Brownstown Road, many homes were severely damaged especially on the north side of the tornado track with estimated speeds of 150 mph (EF3). Farther east, there was massive deforestation on the east side of a ridge just west of and along Henryville-Otisco Road. Several more homes were severely damaged along this road. One of these homes reflected EF4 damage and 170 mph winds.

The tornado rapidly narrowed to a rope-like structure and ended as an EF1 with 90-95 mph winds and an 80 yard wide path. Simultaneously, a new cyclic tornado vortex rapidly formed from the same supercell near Mahan Road and Old State Road 3 immediately southwest of the first tornado. The second tornado began as an EF1 and damaged a church and a few trees. The vortex quickly intensified to EF3 strength as it crossed the south portion of the town of Marysville, severely damaging several homes.


East of Marysville, another cyclic vortex from the parent storm formed just southwest of the intersection of Nabb New Washington Road and Nabb Marysville Road. This vortex intensified and merged with the primary circulation. The tornado severely damaged or destroyed several houses and double wide mobile homes around the intersection of Nabb New Washington and Nabb Marysville. Debris from the double wides were tossed around a mile downwind. The tornado was rated EF3 here with 150 mph winds and a damage width of one-third mile.

The National Weather Service in conjunction with Clark County Emergency Management conducted an exhaustive tornado damage survey on Saturday and Sunday, March 3 and 4. A Civil Air Patrol flight on Sunday, March 4 revealed extensive ground scouring in farmers` fields east of Marysville all the way to the Jefferson-Scott County line. This scouring was evidence of a multi-vortex tornado, which was confirmed by multiple videos and photographs.

In Scott County, immediately north of Highway 362 and east of Concord Road, three homes were severely damaged while five double wide mobile homes were completely destroyed. Here, the tornado was an EF4 with 170 mph winds. Just south of 362 in Clark County, two additional homes and power poles were damaged greatly. From there, the tornado crossed into Jefferson County, Indiana.

A close-up of the tornado tracks through Henryville. The white track with red border is the EF-4 tornado from the first supercell. Note the evidence of multiple vortices developing to the south of the main tornado and wrapping into the larger circulation. The school campus is just northwest of the intersection of Ferguson St. and IN 160. The yellow track is the EF-1 from the second supercell.





Major Strengths

The major strengths identified during this disaster are as follows:

- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- On Site Incident Management
- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
- Restoration of Lifelines
- Responder Safety and Health

- Structural Damage and Assessment

Primary Areas for Improvement

Throughout the disaster, several opportunities for improvement were identified. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

- Emergency Operations Center Management
- Communications
- Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination
- Planning

While there is always room for improvement with every event or disaster, the overall response and recovery within Clark County was exceptional. The courage and dedication of every member who responded during the initial search and rescue, response and ongoing incident management was an example that the entire country and state can follow. Many things went right during this disaster, and the fact that only one fatality was recorded after such a significant natural disaster is a tribute to the first responders who work and train daily.

SECTION 1: INCIDENT OVERVIEW

Event Details

Incident Name

March 2, 2012 Tornado Event

Type of Incident

Natural Disaster / Tornadoes and storms

Incident Start Date

March 2, 2012

Incident End Date

March 20, 2012

Duration

Thirty 12-Hour Operational Periods

Location

Throughout Clark County: Unified Command /Henryville

Mission

Protect lives, search and rescue, emergency response, recovery

Capabilities

Emergency Public Information & Warning

On Site Incident Management

Emergency Operation Center Management

Communications

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response

Restoration of Lifelines

Responder Safety and Health

Structural Damage and Assessment

Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination

Planning

Participating Organizations

Clark County

- Clark County Emergency Management Agency
- Clark County Board of Commissioners
- Clark County Council
- Clark County Auditor's Office
- Clark County Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
- Clark County Sheriff's Dept.
- Clark County Health Dept.
- Monroe Twp. Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Jeffersonville Fire Dept.
- Jeffersonville Police Dept.
- Clarksville Fire Dept.
- Clarksville Police Dept.
- Sellersburg Fire Dept.
- Sellersburg Police Dept.
- Rural Metro Ambulance
- Yellow Ambulance

Mutual Aid

- New Albany Police Dept.
- New Albany Fire Dept.
- Floyd County Sheriff's Dept.
- Lafayette Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Georgetown Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Greenville Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Harrison Twp. Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Utica Volunteer Fire Dept.
- New Chapel Volunteer Fire/EMS
- Miltown Police Dept.
- Harrods Creek Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Floyd County Emergency Management Agency
- Floyd County Health Dept.
- Harrison County Emergency Management Agency

State of Indiana

- Indiana Department of Homeland Security
- Indiana State Police
- Indiana Department of Transportation
- Indiana State Board of Animal Health
- Indiana Department of Natural Resources
- Indiana State Dept. of Health
- Indiana American Red Cross
- Integrated Public Safety Commission
- Indiana Task Force One
- Indiana National Guard
- IDHS Districts 1, 2, 4, 5 & 7
- Indiana State Excise Police
- Indiana Department of Administration
- Indiana Department of Corrections
- Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

Federal

- FEMA Region 5
- United States Army Corps Engineers (USACE)

VOADs

- Adventist Disaster Response
- Three Nails
- UMCORP United Methodist Church
- Catholic Charities
- Clark County American Red Cross
- Metro United Way
- Purdue Extension
- Indiana Office of Faith Based Community

SECTION 2: HAZARD SUMMARY

Clark County lies on the north bank of the Ohio River directly across the river from Louisville, Kentucky. Clark County's population is 110,232 (2010 U.S. Census). The county seat is Jeffersonville. According to the 2010 census, the county has a total area of 376.45 square miles, of which 372.86 square miles is land and 3.60 square miles is water.

There are six cities and towns within Clark County: Borden, Charlestown, Clarksville, Jeffersonville, Sellersburg and Utica. There are 12 unincorporated towns: Bethlehem, Hamburg, Henryville, Marysville, Memphis, Nabb, New Washington, Oak Park, Otisco, Speed, Starlight, and Watson. Clark County has 12 established townships. There are two major interstates (I-65 and I-265) as well as one U.S. highway. Remaining roads consist of state and county roads. Clark County has three public school districts and four private schools, along with three colleges and universities.

Clark County is vulnerable to a wide range of natural, manmade, and technological hazards. Periodic disasters resulting from floods, tornadoes, winter storms, and other catastrophic events cause injuries and loss of life, disruption of services, and the possibility of significant property damage in any community within the County. Such events may also have negative impacts on the areas in which they occur long after the event has taken place. Major disasters such as 1998 Charlestown tire fire, the 1997 Ohio River flood, and the 1993 Colgate Oleum fire have heightened Indiana's awareness to the idea that all Hoosiers are vulnerable to such events. Managing these various threats and protecting life and property are challenges faced by emergency management personnel at all levels of government.

SECTION 3: CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS

Scope of Analysis

Analysis of capabilities has been focused on response mission level and associated capability level analysis. The response mission level is one of the four missions identified by the US Department of Homeland Security. The four mission levels are prevention, protection, response and recovery.

The capability analysis of the response mission is a broad area of evaluation and is used to assess whether an agency or unit has achieved the expected capability outcomes in managing a simulated or real world incident. The focus is principally on outcomes rather than on individual processes. The purpose of this evaluation level is to answer the question: “How prepared is the community to prevent, protect against, respond to and/or recover from a natural or technical disaster?”

The Homeland Security Exercise & Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is the evaluation doctrine that is being used in this report. The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is a capabilities and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. The evaluation and improvement methodology used within the HSEEP program can be easily adapted to real world events.

Capabilities & Assessment Standards

The National Planning Scenarios and establishment of the National Preparedness Priorities have steered the focus of homeland security toward a capabilities-based planning approach. Capabilities-based planning focuses on planning under uncertainty because the next danger or disaster can never be forecast with complete accuracy. Therefore, capabilities-based planning takes an all-hazards approach to planning and preparation that builds capabilities that can be applied to a wide variety of incidents. States and urban areas are encouraged to use capabilities-based planning to identify a baseline assessment of their homeland security efforts by comparing their current capabilities against the Target Capabilities List (TCL) and the tasks of the Universal Task List (UTL) developed by the US Department of Homeland Security. This approach identifies gaps in current capabilities and focuses efforts on identifying and developing priority capabilities and tasks for the jurisdiction. These priority capabilities should be articulated in a jurisdiction’s Homeland Security Strategy and Multiyear Training and Exercise Plan and Schedule.

The capabilities listed within this document have been selected by the After Action Committee based on the common capabilities and response mission area of the Target Capabilities List (TCL). These capabilities provide the direction for development of response plans, policies and procedures.

The selected capabilities for analysis are:

- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- On Site Incident Management
- Emergency Operation Center Management
- Communications
- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
- Restoration of Lifelines
- Responder Safety and Health
- Structural Damage and Assessment
- Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination
- Planning

Capability 1: Emergency Public Information and Warning

Capability Summary: The Emergency Public Information and Warning capability includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

- a) The term “public information” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official and includes both general information and crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) activities. CERC incorporates the urgency of disaster communication with risk communication to influence behavior and adherence to directives.
- b) The term “alert” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide situational awareness to the public and/or private sector about a potential or ongoing emergency situation that may require actions to protect life, health, and property. An alert does not necessarily require immediate actions to protect life, health, and property and is typically issued in connection with immediate danger.
- c) The term “warning” refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide direction to the public and/or private sector about an ongoing emergency situation that requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property. A warning requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property and is typically issued when there is a confirmed threat posing an immediate danger to the public.
- d) The term “notification” refers to any process where Federal, State, local, tribal, and nongovernmental organization, department, and/or agency employees

Observation 1: Activation Process- Initial Communication Release

Analysis: The JIC received several hundred media calls within the first 24 hours after the March 2 tornadoes.

Recommendations: The need for having a pre-drafted, initial press release was reaffirmed. Goal should be to have initial communication released within 30 min of notification of a disaster. Messaging priorities should include (1) overview of the situation, (2) overview of response efforts, (3) steps for public safety in the affected area, (4) steps for would-be volunteers. It’s nearly impossible to draft this release from scratch within that time objective.

Observation 2: Activation Process-Rapid Management of Call Volume

Analysis: Following the tornado touchdown(s), media call volume became immediately overwhelming for one person and it was several hours before the JIC phone lines were adequately staffed. Policies/processes need to be established for rapidly identifying a JIC location and dedicating IT personnel to setting up the integrated JIC IP phone system. Once established, this phone network provides an extremely effective means of handling

call volume with 2-3 staff. Staff doesn't necessarily have to be PIOs to do call intake until a full JIC can be activated. Goal should be to have this phone system staffed within 30 min of a decision to activate the state JIC.

Recommendations: A disaster public information tool kit with emergency PIO resources including partnering state agency PIO contact information and subject matter for an initial press release should be compiled and stored in appropriate locations so it is readily available to any state agency PIOs assisting in the first 90 minutes of a disaster/JIC activation.

Observation 3: Initial Staffing Strategy

Analysis: Once the executive PIO from the lead response agency made the decision to stand up a JIC, notification of JIC staff began immediately. However, because this disaster occurred after close of business on a Friday, it was several hours before the JIC was fully staffed. IDHS PIOs encountered some difficulty in contacting partnering state agency PIOs and there was additional delay between when some PIOs were contacted and when they reported to the JIC.

Recommendation 1: A regularly updated contact list (including after hours and home contact information) for all partnering state PIOs should be maintained and readily available to all state agency PIOs potentially in the position of calling a JIC.

Recommendation 2: A core group of state agency PIOs should be pre-identified as the "first wave" of JIC staffing support. These PIOs should be selected from those state agencies most likely to be involved in manmade and natural disaster response efforts. Each agency should have at least 1 or 2 backups identified in case the primary contact is unavailable. This core group would be expected to fully staff a state JIC for 72 hours following JIC activation. With staffing for the first three days already taken care of, the lead and executive PIOs would be free to focus more attention on JIC operations in the initial hours and develop an extended staffing roster as the situation requires.

Observation 4: Sources of JIC Staffing

Analysis: Staffing support from public and private sector entities active in disaster response efforts are critical to information flow. Partnerships of this kind represented in the March 2012 JIC included FEMA, and the American Red Cross. However, it's important that these representatives are in close contact with their agencies and in a position to speak authoritatively about the disaster-related activities of their agency. A lack of subject matter expertise and authority to provide information were observed in some cases.

Recommendation: Reaching out to local/district PIOs for support in the state JIC was demonstrated as a good staffing strategy. IDHS PIOs were able to identify individuals

who were willing and able to assist in future state JICs. These partnerships are credited to the IDHS-led PIO workshops, conference calls and other relationship building efforts with local public safety PIOs. Additional source of JIC support could be the IDHS District Response Task Forces. Policies and procedures for deploying the PIO elements of these task forces should be established or reaffirmed.

Observation 5: Qualifications and Expectations of JIC Staff

Analysis: Wide discrepancies in the knowledge base and skill sets of JIC staff were observed. While the majority of Indianapolis-based, state level PIOs were both experienced and skilled in public and media relations, many non-Indianapolis-based state PIOs and local emergency management PIOs were ill equipped and lacked critical skill sets for successfully supporting a JIC. In some instances, a general lack of basic computer skills was observed.

Recommendation 1: JIC staff should be carefully selected and assigned by the Lead JIC PIO to appropriate roles based on their skills and experience in public relations and crisis communication. A set of critical skills criteria has been developed to aid this selection process. Individuals lacking these basic qualifications should NOT be asked to assist in a JIC.

Recommendation 2: Numerous IDHS-led opportunities for PIO development at both the state and local level are being made available on an ongoing basis. It is critical that state level PIOs, especially those who would be drafted by their agency to serve in a JIC, be present at these training and development opportunities. It has been observed that in some cases in state agencies with district-level PIOs while the lead PIO attends trainings and meetings, the district-level PIOs are the ones assigned to support the JIC. A state-level PIO training strategy needs to be implemented to fill these education gaps with potential state-level JIC staff.

Recommendation 3: The availability of a brief, orientation sheet and most current disaster-related information went a long way toward rapidly bringing incoming shift staff up to speed. Ideally, incoming JIC staff should be placed on the JIC distribution list at least 24 hours in advance of the beginning of their shift.

Recommendation 4: For the sake of message coordination and consistency, all scheduled JIC shift staff should be available for 12 hour shifts for at least 3 consecutive days. The lack of staff longevity in this activation resulted in unacceptably large amounts of time being devoted to training.

Observation 6: DRTF and Field PIOs

Analysis: During the course of the tornado response, PIOs from the Indiana Incident Management Assistance Team as well as IDHS District Response Task Forces 1 and 2

were deployed to southern Indiana. These PIOs closely and effectively coordinated public information efforts with the state JIC in Indianapolis. This is the most significant successful occurrence on record of field PIOs communicating and working in concert with the state JIC to effectively manage emergency public information.

While some instances of DRTF PIOs operating unilaterally were later discovered, on the whole, field and JIC coordination was successful and effective. Ongoing relationship building and training efforts are expected to remedy the few identified coordination gaps.

This successful coordination validates the distinction in location and function between the field PIOs and the JIC. The role of the field PIO is to serve as a media liaison in the affected area and provide situational awareness to the JIC as well as provide observations about needed messaging. Remotely located near the state Emergency Operations Center, the JIC is in the best position to focus on message development and dissemination, supplement information provided in the field, and manage state, national and international media outside the affected area.

All JIC PIOs did not immediately have a full understanding of roles and geographic location of all deployed PIOs.

While field PIOs and JIC staff maintained an almost constant flow of communication, a once or twice daily scheduled brief period would have allowed all PIO staff to start each operational period with the same basic level of information and would have helped address some identified communication gaps.

Deployed PIOs credit rapid identification of and communication with key local leaders with aiding their ability to successfully facilitate communication between emergency responders, the JIC and the public.

Recommendation 1: Overlapping operational periods with incoming/out-going task forces were recognized as tremendously valuable in facilitating a seamless transfer of command between DRTF PIOs.

Recommendation 2: While the overwhelming majority of communication between the JIC and Field PIOs was successfully conducted via cell phone and email, contingency communication strategies should be explored—radios, satellite phones, etc.

Recommendation 3: Based on the demonstrated reliance of the deployed DRTF PIOs and the state JIC staff on each other to effectively manage crisis messaging efforts, it is recommended that targeted training and ongoing communication efforts be specifically directed toward the IN IMAT and DRTF PIOs.

Observation 7: Messaging and Products- Status Updates

Analysis: Status Updates were compiled 2-3 times a day to provide a consolidated source for media on response efforts, public safety advisories, locally available resources for tornado survivors and advice for would-be volunteers.

Recommendation: These Status Updates should be recognized as a best practice for their ability to succinctly update media and disaster responders on the “big-picture” of a developing situation.

Observation 8: Messaging and Products- Public Safety Press Releases

Analysis: Numerous public safety and public advisory press releases were issued on a wide array of topics. Significant messaging priorities included:
Significant messaging priorities included:

- Information about volunteers and donations
 - It’s critical that this information be made available within the first 30 minutes to help curb self-deployment. A website where would-be volunteers can register should be pre-identified and immediately available to receive registrations after a disaster. OFBCI may be able to supply an acceptable forum. Long-term, ongoing messaging to potential disaster volunteers should also be pursued through OFBCI newsletters and distribution lists.
- Information about locally available recovery resources
- Public safety advisories about protecting disaster survivors from fraud and scams
- Step-by-step information for tornado survivors about what to do next

The IDHS developed press release bank again proved an extremely valuable resource. Some areas for update were identified. These updates should be made.

Field PIOs were instrumental in identifying the need for messaging to advise disaster survivors to ask for help and think ahead about what help they may need in the near future. Many instances of survivors waiting for help to come or failing to request help when it was available were identified. This should be a messaging priority in future disasters.

Recommendation: These Public Safety Press Releases should be recognized as a best practice and used for future disasters.

Observation 9: Daily Recovery Newsletter

Analysis: Recognized by FEMA as a best practice, a daily newsletter was prepared by the state Joint Information Center and circulated in areas affected by the March 2 tornadoes to reach survivors who had limited other means of receiving information due to

communication outages or who didn't want to be inundated by pictures of the disaster on media outlets.

The newsletter focused on positive messages about response and recovery efforts and resources for tornado survivors.

Each issue of the daily newsletter was prepared by the night shift in the state Joint Information Center for the following morning. Morning shift staff reviewed the newsletter, made any last minute updates and forwarded to distribution outlets.

The first issue was released on March 5 and the publication ran daily through March 16 after which FEMA began producing a similarly purposed weekly newsletter.

Field PIOs in the affected area identified a local printer who was willing to print copies of the newsletter. These printed copies were then hand-delivered by volunteers in the affected areas. Initially about 200 were printed, but due to popularity that number quickly rose to around 1,500.

The JIC also reached out to local businesses, libraries and other community venues in the disaster area and faxed or emailed copies of the newsletter to those who were willing to post or otherwise circulate them.

Copies were also made available at the One Stop Shops and at various county commissioner led, town hall meetings.

This newsletter proved critical for proactively providing disaster survivors with information and reducing call volume to IDHS.

Recommendation: A suggested content list for this status update and the daily newsletter should be developed to speed the development of these resources.

Observation 10: Social Media

Analysis: JIC use of social media validated as on-track with common business practice and instrumental in reaching media and general public. Social media also proved a resourceful avenue for tracking private sector assets like Tide "Loads of Hope", Verizon and AT&T communication centers, etc. Value in developing different social media groups targeted to specific groups (volunteers, survivors, etc.) should be explored.

Recommendation: JIC access to social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, was blocked on some JIC machines. This technical issue should be resolved as soon as possible.

Observation 11: Indiana 2-1-1

Analysis: Distribution of information through the Indiana 2-1-1 system proved valuable. Specifically, the utilization of 2-1-1 as a direct communication link for volunteers and affected persons was successful. Indianapolis based 2-1-1 representative reports this was the highest quality and volume of information they have ever received during a disaster.

Recommendation: Process of initially reaching out to Indianapolis 2-1-1 rep to establish communication avenues were validated and should be implemented in future disaster responses.

Observation 12: Town Hall meetings were conducted to inform the population about the governmental response, volunteer and donation services, restoration of lifelines, and risk management information. It has been determined that Town Hall meetings, conducted during disaster response, are a best practice that allow intimate and collaborative information sharing with the public, and to provide coordinated access to key elected and appointed officials, incident management personnel, volunteer and donation organizations, and key stakeholder agencies. Three town hall meetings were conducted, each of which drew standing room only audiences. Information was shared by a wide variety of response entities, key elected and appointed officials, and voluntary service organizations. The result was a more educated populace who were made aware of potential hazards and provided updated information regarding response activities; citizens were able to seek assistance from aid organizations at these meetings.

Analysis: Town hall meetings were conducted in Henryville, Marysville, and Daisy Hill. Attendees were given an updates regarding the governmental response, as well as access to key elected and appointed officials. Attendees were told were government and voluntary aid could be acquired. The populace was also informed of potential post-disaster hazards to be aware of.

Recommendation: The convening of town hall-style meetings should be a standard practice for large scale incidents, during which citizens have diminished access to media outlets because of the loss of utilities and critical infrastructure.

Reference: IDHS Public Information Officer Task Book – Competency 4, Behavior 6, Task 12.

Observation 13: The IMAT team at both the Henryville ICP and the Clark County EOC lacked awareness of print, radio, television, and social media information dissemination. The IMAT was largely unaware of the national media attention the incident had gained. Additionally, many events were planned and coordinated via social media that the IMAT was unaware of. Also, public opinion was significantly circulated using social media. This left the IMAT at a significant disadvantage in managing, responding to, or mitigating issues in this

realm. Thankfully, media coverage of the incident response and management was positive. Lack of social media information put the IMAT at a disadvantage in terms of the provision of public information. In addition, since the IMAT remained unaware of volunteer events that were coordinated over social media, the team was unable to effectively mitigate potential environmental risks that organizing groups might face. General situational awareness was also lacking due to the absence of media monitoring within the IMAT, in terms of both social and standard media.

Analysis: At neither the Clark County EOC, nor Henryville ICP was media monitoring conducted, and limited information was shared with IMAT members. It is unlikely that there were enough PIOs to effectively conduct media monitoring to the extent needed.

Recommendation 1: The IMAT should establish a procedure with the IDHS Public Information Office, and established JIC, during disaster operations, that would result in JIC personnel to conduct pro-active media monitoring, and provide a daily report of incident related media coverage and social media activity to the IMAT.

Recommendation 2: The IMAT should ensure enough PIOs are on-hand to conduct news and social media monitoring within the affected area.

Recommendation 3: When extended operations occur, a partnership with Crisis Commons could be established to support social media monitoring. Crisis Commons is an organization that seeks to advance and support the use of open data and volunteer technology communities to capitalize on innovation in crisis management and global development.

Reference: All-Hazards Public Information Officer Student Manual: Unit 4

Capability 2: On Site Incident Management

Capability Summary: In accordance with State and District plans, policies, procedures and Mobile Support Unit guidance districts must demonstrate the ability to conduct a mobilization of a District Response Task Force within four hours. In accordance with district plans, policies and procedures districts will demonstrate the ability to convey responders to the affected area within six (6) hours. In accordance with district plans, policies and procedures and the Incident Command System (ICS) districts will demonstrate the ability to establish a base camp within four (4) hours.

Observation 1: Conduct Initial Assessment (Size Up) (First Arriving Units): The advance team, sent to conduct an initial assessment, could have completed a more efficient and comprehensive initial assessment, and shared their assessment with team members and the State EOC. The follow-on team members were unable to adequately prepare for their mission assignment. They did not have a clear picture of the situation, equipment and manpower needs, or hazards that may have been encountered.

Analysis: If an advance team is sent ahead of the entire IMAT team, a procedure needs to be established for that team to capture vital information and communicate it to team members deploying to the incident. The structure of the advance team needs to be considered and established prior to any deployment; elements that must be established include who will be included on the advance team, as well as what the responsibilities of the advance team will be, in terms of communication, collection of information, and information sharing with the rest of the team, as well as the State EOC.

Recommendations: Create a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) within in which the following questions are answered:

1. Who will be on an advance team?
2. What information will the advance team collect?
3. What specific information each advance-team member will be responsible for collecting?
4. How the collected information will be communicated to the rest of the team and the State EOC?

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book, Competency 3.

Observation 2: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, state, and federal first responders: While initial contact with the on-scene jurisdictional Incident Commander was positive and beneficial, perception and relationships with other cooperating and assisting agencies suffered. Relationships between IMAT and assisting and cooperating agencies were strained from the beginning of the response, because there existed the perception that IMAT and IDHS had taken over the scene.

Analysis: During initial conversations with the jurisdictional Incident Commander and

the Agency Administrator, the IMAT IC explained that the IMAT was there to support the agency having jurisdiction and the agency administrator. It was further explained that the IMAT would work for, and on behalf of, the agency administrator, and that they would ultimately remain in charge of the incident. The Agency Administrator and the jurisdictional fire chief were thankful for the support and utilized the IMAT team. This relationship developed and strengthened as credibility and respect increased over the duration of the incident. The first several operational periods, however, strained relationships between other local responders and the IMAT persisted. These individuals did not have the benefit of the briefings and meetings between the IMAT IC and the key elected and appointed officials. Their perception was that the IMAT, and thus, IDHS had taken over the incident. This created unnecessary tension within the team environment.

Recommendation 1: As initial meetings and briefings occur with key elected and appointed officials from the agency having jurisdiction, a Liaison Officer should explain the process and IMAT mission to other local responders, in order to mitigate any negative perceptions.

Recommendation 2: The IMAT IC should communicate with the key elected and appointed officials, the need for them to identify the role of the IMAT at the incident scene, and request that they personally explain, at operational period briefings, any delegations of authority or other expectations that they have established for the IMAT, in order to achieve a positive mission outcome, on behalf of the jurisdiction.

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 4, Tasks 1 – 4.

Observation 3: The National Weather Service personnel assigned to conduct an assessment were not integrated into the incident command structure. The NWS sent assessment teams to Henryville; while these teams were co-located with the IMAT, and the information-sharing and collaboration was appreciated, it was less effective than if the personnel had been incorporated into the operations section of the IMAT command structure. Situational awareness and information sharing were diminished. Personnel accountability was also diminished.

Analysis: NWS personnel arrived in Henryville on March 3rd to conduct their assessment. They established a work area in the IMAT Incident Response Vehicle. During their time there, information sharing was good; however, information sharing would have been greatly increased had they formally become part of the command structure. This would have provided greater situational awareness for the IMAT. A NWS assessment was documented on the NWS Louisville website. The information posted would have been extremely beneficial information to the Incident Command, but it wasn't at the time of collection. Also, NWS risk management and personnel accountability would have been enhanced if they had officially become part of the command structure. Note: The NWS personnel were there to conduct their normal storm

surveys after such incidents and were not there to provide technical assistance or meteorological support to the incident.

Recommendation: IMAT should request NWS workers to incorporate into the operations section in future incidents involving NWS personnel.

Reference: ICS-300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents: Unit 3 – Unified Command.

Observation 4: The State IMAT and District All-Hazards Incident Management Teams were the key to establishing unity of effort at the incident, through the use of the Incident Command System. The established unity of effort allowed for the systematic and collaborative focus on incident management, and the provision of organized and effective support to the affected community.

Analysis: From the time the State IMAT arrived, through the use of five District AHIMTs, until the time the State IMAT departed, there was a significant effort to establish a unity of effort. This effort was illustrated through the incorporation of utilities into the incident command structure. This was also reflected by the establishment of a humanitarian services branch that provided for the welfare and common good of the populace. Aid organizations were able to utilize the incident command structure to target needs and provide donations and resources. Town hall meetings were used to share common information to survivors. Hundreds of resources, from numerous state and local agencies, were organized and combined for effective debris management operations, which resulted in a response package that enjoyed great momentum which benefited thousands of Hoosiers.

Recommendations: The Indiana Incident Management Program which has been implemented to develop the State IMAT and District AHIMTs should ensure that its training curriculum offers leadership and teamwork training to always ensure that the built capabilities focus on achieving a unity of effort when employed.

Reference: Indiana Incident Management Program

Observation 5: Determine initial incident site perimeter (First arriving unit): The first defined perimeter (or area of operations) was erroneously too narrow in breadth as Henryville. Later jurisdictions were added to the area of operations as they were identified over the course of nearly a week. The tornado path was not defined until much later into the incident. This resulted in the perimeter continuing to expand over the first week. This inhibited pro-active operations, fostered tunnel vision of the team, and decreased situational awareness.

Analysis: Upon arrival at Henryville, the IC left the helicopter to conduct an initial

briefing with the on-scene IC; he never returned to the helicopter to fly over and identify the area impacted by the tornado. There was not an opportunity on the first evening, due to diminishing daylight, for the IC to conduct such an assessment; however, the IMAT IC never attempted to complete such a flight the following morning or at any other time throughout the incident. During future operations, the IC should clearly define the area of operations after he or she conducts a comprehensive, initial assessment, from the air if possible. If air assets are not available, the IC should conduct an entire site assessment personally, or task personnel to conduct such an assessment. The IC should ensure future responses begin with a comprehensive assessment of the impacted area, and that the area of operations is defined as early as possible. Defined areas of operations should be defined liberally, and reduced as the situation warrants versus continually expanding the perimeter to accommodate new areas of concern. This incident was static in so far as the affected area did not expand after the tornado and severe weather moved through the area. Obviously in an expanding incident where the impacted areas may continue to grow throughout the incident, such as floods or wildfires, this approach to delineation of the area of operation may not be possible.

Recommendations: Create an SOP that will facilitate the over flight of impacted areas, and require collection of the longitudinal and latitudinal limits of these areas, using U.S. National Grid coordinates, in order to provide definitive areas of operations.

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 3, Task 2

Observation 6: Establish an incident command post (ICP), incident bases, camps, staging areas, helispot or helibase, and other facilities, as required: The initial ICP was located within the affected area. As a result of its placement within the affected area, the ICP faced several challenges: it was running on generator power, the building did not have land-line phone service or internet, there was a lack of security, and the ICP served as a drop point for donated goods.

Analysis: The IMAT IC considered the possibility of relocation of the ICP, but elected not to do so, because the ICP had become a center of gravity for the jurisdiction. Relocating to another area, outside of the heavily damaged area, may have resulted in better infrastructure with which to conduct operations, and it would have mitigated most of the security issues. On the other hand, if the ICP had been relocated, it may have been more difficult to get local officials as engaged in the process and response; these key elected and appointed officials may have spent less time at a relocated ICP, which may have resulted in less buy-in, information sharing, and collaboration.

Recommendations: The IMAT IC should discuss the possibility of ICP relocation with the agency administrator during the agency administrator briefing and determine whether the benefits outweigh the negatives of ICP relocation.

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 4, Behavior 5, Task 1.

Observation 7: Direct efforts to achieve personnel accountability. The IMAT has a standard issue PPE / uniform; however, this uniform lacks any identifiable markings. The uniforms consist of standard khaki BDUs with no identifying patches or markings to assist in identification of the wearer. There is no consistent form of identification card among IMAT members. This drab uniform inhibits the identification of IMAT members by other responders and stakeholders. The ambiguity of these uniformed responders results in confusion for local and other state responders, because it is not immediately apparent to them with whom they are dealing with and what that individual's mission is. The result of this uncertainty is a diminished capacity for establishing effective relationships and collaboration and contributes to a false perception that some un-named agency is assuming control of the incident.

Analysis: The IMAT team is a multi-discipline, multi-agency team; the diversity of personnel often results in confusion related to team-member identification, and complicates the process of explaining to external partners and agency administrators the nature of the IMAT's multifaceted structure, culture, and personnel. While IMAT members were observed by many, few knew who the people in khaki uniforms were and what their roles were. They were also unable to quickly determine from which agency or jurisdiction they had come. In some cases, stakeholders thought that IMAT team members were FEMA employees. IMAT members need to be easily identifiable as agents of the state, and it should also be easy to identify their parent agency as well as the host agency, IDHS. This will enable better partnership building and identification of the responders. IMAT members lack a common set of identification cards, which can create difficulty if and when IMAT members are asked what agency they represent by security personnel, at a disaster site.

Recommendation 1: IMAT members should have an iron-on or embroidered logo, or some other identifying symbol on their uniform. The uniform should also contain a State of Indiana patch on one sleeve and the parent agency patch on the opposite sleeve. The entire uniform should be identical across the entire team with the only deviation being the parent agency patch.

Recommendation 2: IMAT members should have a common FIPS 201 compliant identification card issued to each member.

Recommendation 3: Each IMAT member should have an IDHS / IMAT badge issued to them.

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 4, Behavior 5, Task 1.

Observation 8: Implement processes to order, track, assign and release incident resources. Resource management was a challenge in the early stages of the incident, because of the volume of resources that responded to the area. This complexity of this issue was compounded by the fact that there was not an effective process in place to track, assign, and release resources. It took three operational periods to determine what resources were on scene, and to begin including those resources into the Incident Action Plan. During these three days, resource efficiency, situational awareness, and resource documentation were all diminished.

Analysis: Due to the overwhelming mutual aid response, self-deployments, and initial resource surge, there were abundant on-scene resources. The volume of resources complicated the assessment of resources in terms of tracking completed tasks and objectives. This resulted in a command structure which lacked accountability, resulted in the duplication of effort, and diminished efficiency; the IMAT lacked the infrastructure to gain control of these resource management complexities. The IMAT did not deploy with a Staging Area Manager. The Resource Unit Leader was untrained, and the Operations Section Chief became overwhelmed with resources. The lack of a check-in process, combined with the volume of resources at the scene, created a resource management debacle that had to be overcome before efficient operations could begin.

Recommendation: The IMAT needs to anticipate scenarios of this type plying out during future deployments, and ensure that they have the infrastructure to support more expedient, efficient, and effective organization of resources. The IMAT should always be prepared to deploy with qualified personnel that can bring together the Operations Section Chief, the Staging Area Manager, the Resource Unit Leader, and Check-in/out Recorders. All other team members should know how their positions can support effective resource organization and management.

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 6, Task 4.

Observation 9: Confusion in the resource ordering process occurred between the Henryville ICP, the Clark County EOC, and the State EOC over several specific resource requests. The Henryville ICP began ordering specific, by-name resources, which were ultimately requested from the State EOC; the State EOC has never operated by providing specific resources. As a result of the disparity in the two processes, confusion between the IMAT and State EOC, as well as unnecessary delays in resource ordering occurred.

Analysis: Incident Management Teams are trained to have the Operations Section Chief develop tactics, which ultimately define the kind and type of resources needed to support the Incident Action Plan. Those resources are developed on an ICS 215 form, during the tactics meeting in the planning process. Once these specific resources are defined, the needed resources are ordered from the EOC. This is the process that the State IMAT

followed. The Clark County EOC filled as many of those specific resource requests as they could with local resources, and any remaining needs were requested from the State EOC. The State EOC has had a long-standing requirement that local EOCs not ask for specific resources, but rather define what the jurisdiction wants to accomplish with the delivered resources – state the mission not a specific resource. It is thought that this procedure is the result of decades of improper incident management at the local level. Additionally, the nature of some resource requests may actually require a mission and not a specific resource, especially in the case of state resources being deployed to conduct a mission and not be assigned to an incident management team. Initially, when these specific resource requests arrived at the State EOC, there was much confusion about why the requests were made in such a manner, which caused delays in the ordering processing, and required unscheduled meetings to de-conflict the issues.

Recommendation: The State EOC should revise its resource ordering requirements and processes, in order to accommodate various types of resource requests such as:

1. Specific resource requests that are ordered by an incident management team by kind and type, which will then be assigned to an incident.
2. General resources that are ordered when specific tactics are not crucial.
3. Mission assignment requests, when an incident command structure has not yet been established by state services that are needed in an affected area.

Reference: State CEMP, State EOC SOP, All Hazard Incident Management Team Course Curriculum.

Observation 10: At the county EOC, the Logistics Section Chief had to transcribe information from the county mission/task board into the state mission/task board, thereby creating an unnecessary duplication of effort. Receiving mission/tasks in one board and having to transfer the identical request into another board is tedious, time consuming, and creates opportunities for critical errors to occur.

Analysis: When the resource ordering process between the Henryville ICP, the Clark County EOC, and the State EOC was established, a weakness was revealed that required the EOC Logistics Section Chief to re-type every mission/task request, which had not been filled at the local level, into the State EOC mission/task board; this process is duplicative and time consuming. The process would be streamlined if the two boards were linked and interoperable.

Recommendation: WebEOC should be updated to allow processing from the county mission/task board into the state mission task/board, through the use of a radio button or check box similar to the check box that allows counties to send entries on their significant events boards to the state all incidents board.

Reference: WebEOC SOP

Observation 11: Develop the incident action plan (IAP) to establish priorities, procedures, and actions to be accomplished to meet the incident objectives. The planning process was used to achieve unity of effort and establish credibility for the IMAT.

Analysis: The IMAT persevered through the first several operational periods, during which they were developing two IAPs per operational period. The team was sleep deprived, were challenged by a lack of resource awareness that resulted from several resource management challenges, and they were introducing a new concept to responders that had rarely (if ever) used IAPs before. Early IAPs had very “light” ICS 204 forms, in other words, there were few resources listed and assigned. Through all of this, the developed IAPs were used to establish credibility and bring order to chaos. Despite the many issues faced by the team, local responders derived increasing benefit from the planning process with each operational period. By the eighth operational period, most personnel supported the planning process and the IMAT as a whole.

Recommendation: IMAT members should ensure the planning process is always used regardless of the lack of resources or level of buy-in from stakeholders. The planning process ensures information sharing, effective organization, and accountability.

Reference: ICS – 300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents: Unit 5.

Observation 12: The IMAT had to divide into two separate teams in order to fulfill two separate missions. The first mission was to support the ICP, and the second was to support the Clark County EOC. The IMAT had to activate more of its membership, and divide personnel, in order to support both on-site incident management activities, as well as multi-agency coordination center activities. The result of this decision was that excellent communication, coordination, and collaboration developed between the Clark County EOC and the Henryville ICP, which aided the establishment of a resource ordering and management system.

Analysis: The State EOC informed the IMAT that the District 5 AHIMT was not comfortable supporting the county EOC. A strategy was devised to augment current IMAT members with members who had not yet been activated, and send some IMAT personnel from the Henryville ICP to support the Clark County EOC. There was some initial concern about this strategy, among the team members, because members did not want to weaken the Henryville ICP. The IMAT EOC team and the IMAT ICP team experienced several challenges and issues throughout the initial phases of development; however, these issues were always resolved, and a resource ordering and information sharing system was ultimately developed that worked effectively. Through the State IMAT Mission Statement, IDHS has indicated that the IMAT has been designed to support on-site incident management activities, as well as multi-coordination activities. This incident proved that, not only was this possible, but that the State IMAT was capable of doing both activities simultaneously.

Recommendation: Using an AHIMT to support on-site incident management activities or multi-agency coordination activities is a best practice. IDHS, through the Indiana Incident Management Program, should ensure that all District AHIMTs are trained, prepared, and qualified to support activities at either level.

Reference: State IMAT Mission Statement.

Observation 13: Local responders were not used to their fullest capacity or potential. Incident management activities were either not performed, or were not performed adequately, in various areas, due to the team's failure to engage with and utilize local responders who had a desire to provide assistance. Operations suffered in areas where positions went unfilled and/or certain units did not have sufficient staffing.

Analysis: During the 18-day incident, several positions went unfilled or units remained understaffed. Early in the response, it may have been too much of a burden on trained personnel to try and mentor local responders into a unit or position for which they were not previously trained. After the incident stabilized, local responders could have been put into certain positions and/or units in which they could have become a force multiplier for the incident; local responders could have been used to support various units or positions within the incident management structure.

Recommendation: As soon as incident stabilization is achieved and organization is established, IMAT members should incorporate local responders into the incident management structure.

Reference: IDHS Logistics Section Chief Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 5, Task 1.

Observation 14: All personnel involved in All-Hazard Incident Management Teams and the State IMAT have received consistent, comprehensive NIMS training through the Indiana Incident Management Program. The State IMAT and District AHIMTs were able to merge together and operate as a cohesive unit. Teamwork resulted from standardized and consistent training, which allowed all command and management personnel to work effectively and perform tasks uniformly, within the incident command system. This resulted in an organized, effective, and efficient response.

Analysis: In July of 2009, the Indiana Department of Homeland Security implemented the Indiana Incident Management Program, through which the agency sought to develop 11 (10 district teams and 1 State IMAT) All-Hazard Incident Management Teams (Type III). This entailed a rigorous training regimen, through which numerous All-Hazard Incident Management Team Courses and ICS Position Specific training courses have been offered. A Position Task Book qualification system, for teams to follow in the development of team members, was also implemented. The district All-Hazard Incident Management Teams that were sent to Clark County, as well as the State IMAT, all had a

significant number of members who had completed these courses. When teams were integrated during the incident, the personnel from different teams worked effectively in tandem with one another. Standardized processes that were taught in the training courses were followed, which enabled teams to merge together seamlessly. In numerous cases, District AHIMT members were working for State IMAT personnel, and in several other cases, State IMAT personnel were working for District AHIMT personnel. This ensured an organized, efficient, and effective response.

Recommendation: The Indiana Incident Management Program should continue to be cultivated and supported, as it has now been validated as a best practice for the preparedness of Indiana responders.

Reference: FEMA NIMS 5-Year Training Plan and the Indiana Incident Management Program.

Observation 15: All-Hazard Incident Management Teams were afforded the opportunity to shadow personnel working in the positions they would eventually occupy, for one day, before the transfer of command. The opportunity for oncoming All-Hazard Incident Management teams to shadow their predecessors facilitated a smooth, seamless transition. A smooth, seamless transition ensured continuity and the preservation of institutional knowledge, which resulted in a greater level of effectiveness and consistency of operation.

Analysis: At the Henryville ICP:

On March 5, the District 7 AHIMT IC shadowed the State IMAT IC which was followed by a transfer of command to the District 7 team on March 6. The State IMAT remained on scene throughout the operation, which preserved the institutional knowledge. On March 10th, the District 2 AHIMT shadowed the District 7 Team, and then District 2 assumed command on March 11th. Command was later transferred back to the local jurisdiction, supported by the State IMAT, on March 17th.

At the Clark County EOC:

Clark County personnel and the State IMAT members established the county EOC on March 5th. The District 1 AHIMT shadowed the State IMAT on March 10th, and assumed EOC functions on March 11th. The EOC was then completely turned over to Clark County on March 17th.

Recommendation: This transfer of command and shadowing opportunity was recognized as a best practice by all parties involved, and should be implanted as policy for all future activations of AHIMTs that undergo a transfer of command (when circumstances permit).

Reference: ICS 300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents. Unit 7: Demobilization, Transfer of Command, and Closeout.

Observation 16: A Delegation of Authority was established for the District AHIMT ICs that were in command of the incident. The use of Delegations of Authority was demonstrated as a best practice through this deployment. Legal issues surrounding the assumption of command by qualified incident commanders, working in areas outside of their normal jurisdiction, were addressed. Legal authority of Incident Commanders to spend funds on behalf of the local jurisdictions was established. Delegations of authority ensured local elected officials always remained responsible.

Analysis: This was the first incident in Indiana during which a delegation of authority was used. By the end of the response operation, two Incident Commanders had been covered by a Delegation of Authority in Clark County, and a Delegation of Authority had been established in Washington County for another Incident Commander. A delegation of authority template was created by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security legal counsel; the template was used during agency administrator briefings to explain what a delegation of authority was and what purpose it served.

Recommendation 1: Review the current delegation of authority template, make necessary revisions based upon lessons learned from this deployment, and provide this template to each District AHIMT for use across the state.

Recommendation 2: Ensure delegations of authority are comprehensively taught and explained in forums such as key elected and appointed official workshops, district seminars, the Legal Issues in Emergency Management training course, and speaking engagements in front of key elected and appointed officials.

Reference: IDHS All-Hazards Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 3, Task 4.

Observation 17: Interface between the State IMAT and District AHIMTs. The mission of the State IMAT is to support local jurisdictions; it is not the mission of the IMAT to assume command at a local level. District AHIMTs are designed to assume command, at the local level, under a delegation of authority. Through this incident the State IMAT proved to be an effect initial response team, which can support the local jurisdiction while working to achieve incident stabilization, until a district AHIMT can be activated and deployed to the incident. The State IMAT can remain on-scene and support incident management activities as needed. The initial activity of the State IMAT provided critical assistance in terms of on-scene incident management, and established the foundation and framework from which other teams could operate. State IMAT personnel remained on-scene in support of incident management activities, when and where support was needed. This ensured institutional knowledge remained at the scene, and ensured consistency within incident management activities.

Analysis: The State IMAT arrived within 4 hours of the first request for support; other teams were not requested for another 48 hours. Once the District 7 AHIMT was

integrated into the Henryville ICP, a framework for incident management had been established and a smooth transition occurred during the transfer of command.

Recommendation 1: The State IMAT should, from this point forward, be viewed and utilized, by the State of Indiana and local jurisdictions, as a first-in response team during emergencies, disasters, and other times of need.

Recommendation 2: The State IMAT should, from this point forward, be viewed and utilized, by the State of Indiana and local jurisdictions, as follow-on support team to fill vacant positions within the incident command structure, during emergencies, disasters, and other times of need.

Recommendation 3: The activation of District AHIMTs should occur earlier in a response, when it is determined that incident management resources are needed to support or assume command in areas impacted by disaster.

Reference: Indiana Incident Management Program

Observation 18: Utility personnel were incorporated into the operations section while conducting restoration of lifelines. Tactical resources of the gas utility, water utility, and local REMC were incorporated into the operations section; this inclusion proved to be a best practice. Incorporating utility personnel into the operations section greatly enhanced operations, situational awareness, and safety.

Analysis: Initial contact with all of the utility companies was established by the Liaison Officer. Utility companies had been feverishly to repair utility systems in the area; however, operations had become siloed and minimal information had occurred. The LOFR continued to communicate with all utility agents each day until utility branch director was assigned. Utility updates were briefed out by the LOFR at the Ops Period Briefings at the end of each day. The Operations Section Chief coordinated with the Liaison Officer to establish an agreement that would result in the utilities conducting operations within the incident command structure. A member of the local water company was selected as the utility branch director. On March 5th, and each day after, utility work began after utility personnel attended the operational period briefing. This gave the operations section chief a clearer picture of the progress attained toward the restoration of lifelines. This picture allowed the Operations Section Chief to reallocate debris management resources into areas in which gas leaks and live power lines had already been addressed and rendered safe. This strategy also facilitated debris removal that would provide access, for utility workers, into areas where utility work needed to be completed.

Recommendation 1: During future operations involving utility providers, it should be a priority to incorporate utility personnel into the operations section.

Recommendation 2: An Indiana program of ICS training and disaster operations awareness should be implemented to educate Indiana utility providers, and facilitate collaborative and cooperative relationships with them.

Reference: Clark County Tornado Incident Action Plans.

Observation 19: A Finance and Administration Section was used to document worker time and, estimate the costs of expenditures. The Finance and Administration Section was an invaluable asset during this incident, and was used to track costs, worker time, and manage administrative matters. Time and costs were recorded at the scene more effectively at this incident than any other disaster in Indiana history.

Analysis: Finance and Administrative Personnel from District 4 AHIMT worked together with the State IMAT to establish the Finance and Administration Section. Districts 7 and 2 AHIMT Finance and Administration personnel also joined the section during their tour of duty. District 1 AHIMT Finance and Administration personnel supported the Clark County EOC finance and administration operations. Daily costs were estimated and crew time reports were recorded with incredible detail. Of the finance and administration personnel, only two had been qualified through the position task book process. The finance and administration section also faced significant challenges, which stemmed from the fact that most responders involved in the incident had never been on an incident in which the finance and administration section had been established. Many of these responders were unfamiliar with crew time reports, equipment time reports, and other administrative functions. Through the use of a finance and administration section, the IMAT demonstrated a capability that has rarely been utilized in Indiana. The reimbursement processes and public assistance will be conducted more efficiently and effectively with this type of documentation.

Recommendation 1: More Finance and Administration Section Chiefs and Finance and Administration Unit Leaders need to be trained and qualified, in Indiana, to build this capability.

Recommendation 2: A standardized guidance document about Indiana Mobile Support Unit reimbursement procedures needs to be developed from which Finance and Administration personnel can operate.

Reference: IDHS All-Hazards Finance/Administration Section Chief Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 6, Task 1.

Capability 3: Emergency Operation Center Management

Capability Summary: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities. Similar entities may include the National (or Regional) Response Coordination Center (NRCC or RRCC), Joint Field Offices (JFO), National Operating Center (NOC), Joint Operations Center (JOC), Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), Initial Operating Facility (IOF), etc.

Observation 1: The IMAT was unable to obtain critical maps, maps vital to IMAT operations. The IMAT did not possess appropriate maps needed for information sharing, situational awareness, documentation, and IAP development. As a result of the absence of relevant maps, the IMAT was unable to develop good situational awareness regarding the area's geography as quickly as otherwise would have been possible. Due to the lack of good situational awareness, some communities remained unchecked in terms of welfare and status. Furthermore, recipients of IAPs lacked situational awareness, and the planning section experienced a more difficult time documenting and cleared areas and damage assessment information.

Analysis: Upon arrival at the ICP, the IMAT determined that adequate maps were not available. The IMAT requested maps from the State EOC, but didn't receive them until several days later, which resulted in a diminished incident management capability. The IMAT should have had maps available before arrival. In addition, IMAT should have mapping software and the capability to print maps when deployed. The State EOC did not have sufficient GIS personnel available during this incident, and mapping software on the Incident Response Vehicle was inoperable. At the commencement of all future deployments, all IMAT members should have U.S. National Grid mapping books in their go-kits; these mapping books should always be available on the Incident Response Vehicle and Mobile Command Center.

Recommendation 1: Train all IMAT members in the use of the U.S. National Grid System.

Recommendation 2: Ensure all IMAT members have a U.S. National Grid capable GPS available to them when deployed.

Recommendation 3: Ensure U.S. National Grid map books of Indiana are available to all IMAT members.

Recommendation 4: Establish deployable GIS capability in several Districts to

provide a pool of field mapping staff and to keep software and hardware in operating condition on the Indiana Incident Response Vehicle and District incident response vehicles.

Recommendation 5: Include exchange of electronic and hard copy mapping products and data as part of the battle handoff or mobilization of district or state resources.

Reference: IDHS Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 1, Task 1.

Observation 2: Upon arrival in Henryville, the District 7 AHIMT was initially given an unclear, unrealistic, and duplicative mission. The District 7 AHIMT's assigned mission was to create a debris management plan and manage debris operations within Clark County. This mission was confusing, especially as it related to the Henryville operations. District 7 AHIMT members became frustrated and de-motivated. There was persistent confusion between the District 7 team, the Henryville ICP, and the Clark County EOC.

Analysis: The District 7 AHIMT was assigned to develop and implement a debris management plan for the Clark County areas of operation; however, operational authority and interface instructions and expectations with the county EOC and Henryville ICP were not well defined. This resulted in confusion and disharmony. Any AHIMT that is assigned a mission should have a very clear assignment, with a defined geographic area, and proper authorities.

Recommendation: Ensure State IMAT members and State EOC personnel are trained in how to define and establish clear mission assignments for AHIMTs.

Reference: ICS 300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents: Units 4 and 5.

Observation 3: The District 5 AHIMT did not feel capable to run a local EOC. The District 5 AHIMT did not feel they were capable to manage the Clark County EOC in support of Clark County EMA. AHIMTs are supposed to be capable of dealing with flexible and modular missions and be able to apply ICS as a management tool to a variety of missions or assignments. The State IMAT activated more personnel in order to support the Clark County EOC.

Analysis: The intent of the Indiana Incident Management Program was to develop All Hazard Incident Management Teams that could adapt to a variety of situations, incidents, and events and apply ICS management principles to manage assigned tasks. All Hazard Incident Management Teams should be capable of managing points of distribution, EOCs, logistical staging areas, EMAC reception sites, disaster recovery centers, Multi-Agency coordination centers, one-stop shops as well as Incident Command Posts.

Recommendation 1: Ensure all Indiana AHIMTs understand that they could be called upon to manage a variety of missions with the expectation that they will adapt team

performance to the mission and apply ICS principles to manage the assignment.

Recommendation 2: Ensure all Indiana AHIMTs receive EOC Management training.

Reference: Indiana Incident Management Program.

Observation 4: EOC Activation

Analysis: The EOC effectively activated the Staffing Plan through the use of multiple redundant systems taking the EOC from a Level IV to a Level II. The EOC was fully staffed with 45 personnel within 4 hours. The NXT alert system contacted 197 people successfully and the Blast Call, conference call, reached 23 individuals.

Recommendation: The EOC's staffing plan, with its flexibility, enhanced the SEOC's ability to meet the changing needs of the impacted area. Continued updates need to be made to ensure correct contact information when it comes to EOC personnel.

Observation 5: EOC Sustainment

Analysis: The EOC maintained qualified ESF personnel during the activation. The EOC was able to maintain steady, multiple 24 hour operational periods with the required ESF knowledge. Key sections within the EOC were able to cross train newer staff members to increase the depth of trained personnel.

Recommendation: Continued EOC training, as well as cross training, needs to occur in order to sustain a depth of qualified personnel readily available to staff the SEOC.

Observation 6: IN-Volunteer Organizations After Disaster (IN-VOAD)

Analysis: VOAD was actively used in the SEOC. The ESF-14 seat was occupied for multiple operational periods, participating in Shift Briefs and supporting SEOC Executive Summaries, Situation Reports and IAPs.

Recommendation: Increased training of VOAD representatives in ICS and SEOC operations is an extreme need for the state. A further awareness of VOAD capabilities is needed to further support local response to events and situations.

Capability 4: Communications

Capability Summary: Communications is the fundamental capability within disciplines and jurisdictions that practitioners need to perform the most routine and basic elements of their job functions. Agencies must be operable, meaning they must have sufficient wireless communications to meet their everyday internal and emergency communication requirements before they place value on being interoperable, i.e., able to work with other agencies.

Communications interoperability is the ability of public safety agencies (police, fire, EMS) and service agencies (public works, transportation, hospitals, etc.) to talk within and across agencies and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems, exchanging voice, data and/or video with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and when authorized. It is essential that public safety has the intra agency operability it needs and that it builds its systems toward interoperability.

Observation 1: JIC and EOC Coordination

Analysis: Communication and coordination efforts between the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and JIC staff were highly effective—much more so than in previous activations. This ease of communication is credited with ongoing education and relationship building efforts. ESF and JIC staff demonstrated an improved level of understanding and appreciation for the roles of the other.

After the first couple of days, the JIC was able to have a high level of reliability on the information posted in WebEOC. EOC staff seemed to do a good job posting a significant quantity of high quality, updated information.

JIC location in Indianapolis, remote from the disaster area and in close proximity to the SEOC, was validated. This location provides greater access to high-level information and to executive leadership. While the need for field PIOs and the JIC's reliance on them for information and messaging direction was also clearly demonstrated, the role of the JIC was shown to be distinctly necessary to an effective crisis communication effort.

Recommendation 1: JIC should be added to the Executive Summary distribution list.

Recommendation 2: ESFs apparently can't see the press release board on WebEOC. They should be given this access. The JIC should also add all EOC email addresses to its distribution list.

Recommendation 3: EOC needs to update its ESF call list. JIC had tremendous difficulty reaching ESFs who were working remotely during week two of the activation.

Recommendation 4: Pre-printed organizational charts of JIC/EOC/Field PIO positions would go a long way toward clarifying lingering confusion about who does what from

where.

Observation 2: Communications to IMAT members via email were ineffective and overwhelmed team members. Email communications from the State EOC to IMAT members were not received, because email systems were inoperable in the early stages of the incident. In addition, email volume was overwhelming once email systems became functional. Vital information was not received by IMAT members from the EOC during the most critical time, the first several hours, of the incident.

Analysis: The State EOC relies heavily on email communication, and on recipients of critical information receiving email messages via Smartphone or Blackberry. The State EOC did not know that email systems were down in the affected area; IMAT members did not receive critical email messages during the first several operational periods of the response. Once email systems became functional, and due to the magnitude of the incident, IMAT members were overwhelmed with the large volume of emails from the State EOC, which also included regular email, as well as messages from other information seekers. The deluge of emails prevented IMAT members from effectively receiving and reading all of their email, which resulted in a great deal of missed information.

Recommendation: The State EOC should ensure that all critical information sent to IMAT members is communicated on scheduled conference calls, or the IMAT Branch Director should be assigned the task of ensuring that critical communications are delivered with confirmed receipt of the intended IMAT member(s).

Reference: State EOC Operations Section SOP

Observation 3: The IMAT experienced significant difficulties with the alert and notification of team members, which resulted from the absence of an established, common procedure or the supporting infrastructure to support this capability. As a result of this deficiency, team members did not receive clear information regarding the time of deployment, location of other team members, what equipment was required for the deployment, the deployment destination for team members, or an appropriate route to travel to get to the deployment location.

Analysis: The team had knowledge of this deficiency prior to this deployment, and had begun to develop a resolution to the challenge of the team alert and notification process. At the commencement of this incident corrective action had not been completed, so the alternative strategy employed was to use an email system. When the team activated, the individual responsible for team activation at the State EOC was also the team's IC. This individual was simultaneously filling the role of Operations Section Chief at the State EOC. Within a short period of time, this individual was also tasked with being on the advanced team deployed by helicopter to Henryville. Serving in all of these capacities

simultaneously limited his ability to effectively communicate with the team about the incident situation and other pertinent information. In addition, by fulfilling several roles, the IMAT IC was unable to effectively communicate with team members about who was to travel to Henryville via helicopter, and who needed travel to the disaster area within the team convoy. Team members who staged and completed mission preparation at the 5-Points logistical facility did not receive critical information about mission assignment and the incident situation.

Recommendation 1: When the IMAT is alerted, establish a radio talk group for all team members to utilize for critical information sharing and mission direction.

Recommendation 2: Complete the current process of including all team members on the existing NXT system, in order to facilitate an effective alerting process.

Recommendation 3: Develop an alert and dispatch SOP for the team to follow when activated.

Reference: USDHS Target Capabilities List. Communications Target Capability. Alert and Dispatch Activity.

Capability 5: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Capability Summary: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, and demobilize and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary to preserve life, property, safety, and security. Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for proper distribution, in order to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.

Observation 1: Convoy operations were problematic due to a lack of convoy procedures. Effective pre-convoy and convoy operations facilitate safer response, provide greater accountability, and ensure personnel respond with the proper equipment. Without convoy SOPs, team supplies were left behind, there was a lack of identified commonality among the convoy vehicles, and a higher level of vehicular infiltration within the convoy. Support Excise Police were not able to mesh with IMAT personnel due to the absence of SOPs. Without the appropriate procedures in place, it is not possible to ensure and optimize the safety of equipment and personnel during the convoy, and in addition, response effectiveness and timeliness is reduced.

Analysis: The IMAT departed Indianapolis for Henryville without a proper SOP, which resulted in the team deploying without all necessary, valuable team supplies. In addition, the team did not know their precise destination, and did not have an identified, ideal route of travel. The team didn't have placards on vehicles in the convoy, or a full list of vehicles with occupant lists. In the absence of proper procedures, critical equipment was left behind, poor convoy tactics were employed, and improper situational awareness resulted. In the future, convoys need to be better planned and executed in accordance with a clear, common SOP.

Recommendation: Develop pre-deployment and convoy SOPs for the IMAT to follow on future activations.

Reference: IDHS Operations Section Chief Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 1, Task 2.

Capability 6: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response

Capability Summary: Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).

Observation 1: A policy issue was identified, which pertained to the legal authority of the Indiana State Police to enforce a local ordinance, including a declaration of emergency disaster that establishes a curfew. It was quickly determined that the many supporting Indiana State Police Troopers were not legally permitted to enforce Clark County Commissioners' established curfew. Without this legal authority, the Indiana State Police were diminished in their capacity to conduct emergency safety and security operations.

Analysis: The IMAT sought legal opinions from both ISP legal counsel and IDHS legal counsel. Together, the attorneys developed a strategy to have the Clark County Commissioners revise their declaration of emergency disaster, in which they would link the curfew restrictions to the newly passed travel advisory system in Indiana Code. This modification linked the declaration to a state statute, which enabled ISP Troopers to enforce the curfew.

Recommendation: The IDHS should develop a new template for local disaster emergency declarations, and include instructions or guidance that will advise local jurisdictions how to link curfew enforcement to this particular Indiana code, and disseminate this guidance to all EMA directors in the state.

Reference: Indiana Code 10-14-3-29 Local Disaster Emergency.

Observation 2: Indiana Task Force 1 members conducted search and rescue operations for three days; their tactical personnel covered a significant area. Collectively, they acquired a great deal of incident knowledge that needs to be better obtained by the incident command structure. Indiana Task Force 1 tactical personnel conducted a comprehensive search of a significant portion of the tornado-damaged area from beginning of the tornado path to the end. The IMAT did not capitalize on the knowledge INTF-1 developed through their operations, but could have done so through in-depth debriefs and proactive information sharing. The INTF-1 demobilized during the 6th operational period, which was still relatively early in the incident response. IMAT members were provided with maps of areas cleared by INTF-1; however, there were minimal additional interactions, and virtually no further detailed discussions between personnel from the two teams. After INTF-1 demobilized, the institutional knowledge they had gained of the area was lost.

Analysis: INTF-1 members scoured the entire area for trapped survivors, and over the

course of three days, they covered most of the 49-mile-tornado track; they did a phenomenal job. The IMAT could have benefitted from the gained knowledge, only if key INTF-1 members had been debriefed, and information about their findings in the affected area been documented. During operations, the INTF-1 Team Leader was asked if the rescuers searching the area could also report windshield surveys of the damage they encountered. The response to that request was negative, based upon the fact that the responders were moving too fast. If INTF-1 responders do in fact move too quickly to provide this information, then regular debriefs need to occur in order for the IMAT to gather the critical information that the INTF-1 team members absorb during their operations. Sharing of this critical disaster intelligence may have helped the IMAT from overlooking the Daisy Hill and Mt. Moriah areas, which had been significantly impacted by the tornado; the IMAT was not initially aware that these areas were impacted.

Recommendation 1: INTF-1 members capture critical damage assessment and other information during their search and report it to the Situation Unit Leader at the end of each operation.

Recommendation 2: At the conclusion of search operations during each operational period, searchers should be interviewed by the Situation Unit Leader, Documentation Unit Leader, Operations Section Chief, and other pertinent personnel to acquire disaster intelligence gathered by searchers.

Reference: Indiana Task Force 1 Standard Operating Procedure

Capability 7: Restoration of Lifelines

Capability Summary: Restoration of Lifelines is the capability to manage clearing and restoration activities (e.g., demolition, repairing, and reconstruction). This includes the restoration of essential gas, electric, oil, communications, water, wastewater and sewer, transportation and transportation infrastructure, and other utilities; this also includes clearing debris from lifelines (e.g., transportation, communications, and utilities).

Observation 1: Providing humanitarian assistance was a priority objective for the IMAT. The provision of humanitarian assistance, and the manner in which it was accomplished, was later determined to be a best practice. The IMAT and tactical resources built an infrastructure that facilitated the identification of citizens and/or communities that were in need of assistance, and established the capability of surging humanitarian assistance packages to the identified areas, in order to win the “hearts and minds” of the populace.

Analysis: Disaster Mental Health Specialists were assigned to the Humanitarian Services Branch. During operations, Disaster Mental Health Specialists were sent into affected areas to conduct mental health operations. With their personal contact with survivors, they were able to identify personal needs of survivors and communities at large. Other personnel in the organizational structure were also able to identify these needs, such as the Liaison Officers, Public Information Officers, and other tactical personnel. When needs were identified, it was communicated to the Humanitarian Services Branch, which would then task the Relief Group with the acquisition of volunteer assistance or donated goods, and provide those resources to the survivors in need. Additionally, when whole communities were identified as a community in need, a surge package of humanitarian goods and services were flooded into the area rapidly.

Recommendation 1: During future incidents, where great loss is observed by individuals and communities, the State of Indiana should utilize this model to ensure effective application of mental health services, volunteer services, and management of donated goods in order to keep the affected population supplied with provisions and services, and provide for their basic needs.

Recommendation 2: The State IMAT should ensure that there are enough team members, in the operations section, trained to lead a Humanitarian Services Branch in order to effectively provide volunteer support and donations to the impacted population.

Recommendation 3: Ensure the Humanitarian Service Branch Director works closely with the OSC to avoid waste of volunteer resources, develop proper staging areas for incoming supplies and manpower. Control unaffiliated volunteers and or provide an avenue to use their skills and bring key leaders of volunteer agencies into the Incident Command Systems as subject matter expert at the ICP under the Humanitarian Services Branch Director.

Reference: Clark County Tornado IAPs

Capability 8: Responder Safety and Health

Capability Summary: Responder Safety and Health is the capability that ensures adequate trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on-scene first responders, hospital/medical facility personnel (first receivers), skilled support personnel, and, if necessary, their families through the creation and maintenance of an effective safety and health program. This program needs to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and any other applicable Federal and State regulations and health and safety standards.

Observation 1: The Situation Unit Leader was able to identify approaching severe and potentially dangerous weather prior to its arrival in the area of operations, during on-going operations. The IMAT Situation Unit Leader was a trained meteorologist; her educational background provided her with the tools to identify potentially problematic and dangerous weather that was going to impact the area of operations, and did so in great detail. Awareness of potential bad weather enabled the Safety Officers to conduct better hazard analyses and develop appropriate mitigation strategies. This advanced warning also enabled general safety messages to be included in the IAPs, and for information to be shared at operational period briefings with responders. Constant weather monitoring also allowed warnings to be communicated to all responders via radio messages when needed.

Analysis: The Situation Unit Leader monitored weather patterns and generated several weather assessments (See appendix). Problematic weather during this incident ranged from winter weather advisories with covering snows to severe thunderstorms and hail storms to high temperatures. The Situation Unit Leader's consistent and accurate monitoring of the weather ensured that the IMAT could expect the problematic weather, develop mitigation strategies, and implement operational risk management strategies to keep responders safe.

Recommendation: All Situation Unit Leaders on IMAT should undergo some basic weather training, and IMAT should ensure that they deploy with at least one person who is highly trained in meteorology.

Reference: Clark County Tornado IAPs

Capability 9: Structural Damage and Assessment

Capability Summary: Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment is the capability to conduct damage and safety assessments of civil, commercial, and residential infrastructure and to perform structural inspections, and mitigation activities. The capability includes being able to provide contractor management, construction management, cost estimating, technical assistance, and other engineering services to support and manage response and recovery operations.

Observation 1: Incident management operations resulted in effective and efficient debris management operations through the development of debris management task forces and strike teams. Debris management operations, conducted by responders, were generally viewed positively by county officials and stakeholders due to the effectiveness of debris management resources, which were formed into task forces and strike teams. Initial debris management operations were effectively and efficiently conducted, and resulted in a significant reduction of debris in the affected area. By the end of the week, over 1,000 loads of debris had been hauled to landfills and/or an air curtain incinerator.

Analysis: Resources from DNR Forestry, Indiana Department of Transportation, Clark and Washington Counties, Indiana Department of Corrections, and Indiana Department of Environmental Management worked in tandem with one another to establish an effective debris management strategy.

Recommendation: During future incidents that have a significant debris management mission, the State of Indiana should utilize a similar debris management strategy that brings several multi-agency resources together to cut, load, and haul debris from the disaster area.

Reference: ICS 300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents. Unit 6: Resource Management

Observation 2: The establishment of a debris management contractor was a tedious process with many complex rules that need to be factored into the contracting process. The IMAT needs a simplified document that explains all the necessary steps required to establish a debris management contract, which can also be used to coach and mentor local officials through the contracting process. Establishing a debris management contract in Clark County took approximately 10 days. The process involved coaching and mentoring, of local elected and appointed officials, at several meetings and discussions.

Analysis: Early in the incident, IMAT personnel began working with Clark County to establish a debris management contractor, who would deal with debris issues. The more rapidly a contractor could be established, the more rapidly state and local resources could be released. Specific requirements by state and federal code, rules, and regulations make the establishment of a contractor a confusing, time consuming, and complex process. The IMAT would have been more successful in assisting the County Commissioners with the

establishment of a contract, had a simplified job-aid been created to assist IMAT members walk key elected and appointed officials through this complex process.

Recommendation: A simplified job-aid should be created that can be used to help coach and mentor local and elected officials through the complex process of establishing a debris management contract. This job-aid needs to account for all of the relevant and applicable state and federal laws, rules, and regulations.

Reference: FEMA Public Assistance Debris Management Job Aid

Capability 10: Intelligence & Information Sharing and Dissemination

Capability Summary: The Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination capability is the multi-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local, and Tribal layers of government, the private sector and citizens. The goal of sharing and dissemination is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely, and preferably declassified or unclassified information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to the consumers who need it. More simply, the goal is to get the right information to the right people at the right time. An effective intelligence/information sharing and dissemination system will provide durable, reliable, and effective information exchanges (both horizontally and vertically) between those responsible for gathering information and the analysts and consumers of threat-related information. It will also allow for feedback and other necessary communications in addition to the regular flow of information and intelligence.

Observation 1: IMAT members' WebEOC accounts are state-level accounts and inhibited the proper information and resource request flow from the local level to the county level to the State EOC. IMAT members need a wide range of WebEOC access due to the team's varying missions. Current permissions only allow team members to operate within the state environment, with state-level accounts. Team members need to be able to post to all Indiana county-level boards, as well as to state level boards. Mission/tasks that were posted to WebEOC could not be seen at the Clark County EOC, which would have allowed resources to be filled locally. IN addition, information that was posted that pertained to situation status was also not visible at the local level.

Analysis: The IMAT Logistics Section Chief, at the Henryville ICP, and the IMAT Logistics Section Chief, at the Clark County EOC, began to set up a resource ordering and tracking system utilizing the WebEOC system. Both individuals possessed only state-level permissions within WebEOC, and did not have adequate access within the system to post to the Clark County Mission/Task Board. The Situation Unit Leader was posting situation reports on the IDHS All Incidents Board, which is not commonly monitored by locals. The IMAT can be deployed to support the State, a county in an EOC, or a local ICP. If IMAT is to be effectively operational within the resource request and mission/task process delineated within WebEOC, then all IMAT members need to have access to every county WebEOC area. A workaround was used in Henryville to establish this process.

Recommendation 1: Each IMAT member should be granted access to every county WebEOC system.

Recommendation 2: An SOP should be developed to provide access to the affected jurisdiction's WebEOC area, for each IMAT member, when the team is activated and deployed.

Reference: WebEOC SOP

Observation 2: As a result of an insufficient number of trained Liaison Officers, information sharing with the internal and external stakeholders was limited and not as comprehensive as it could have been. The IMAT Liaison Officer was overwhelmed due to the number of stakeholders involved in this incident. Many stakeholders were not involved, and/or information could not be shared with stakeholders, due to the magnitude of the incident and the limited number of Liaison Officers available.

Analysis: The IMAT initially deployed one Liaison Officer to Henryville. There were a significant number of issues that developed, and needed to be resolved, throughout this incident, in part due to the high volume of stakeholders associated with the level of damage. Over the course of the incident, several Assistant Liaison Officers were used; the highest number of Liaison Officers and assistants on-scene at any given time was four. Having at least five Liaison Officers assigned to an incident of this magnitude, throughout most of the response, would have been an appropriate minimum number. This number of Liaison Officers would have facilitated better information flow to stakeholders, and increased response-agency involvement in the planning process.

Recommendation: In future incidents, Assistant Liaison Officers should be requested early, and local responders should be recruited to support Liaison Officer functions.

Reference: IDHS Liaison Officer Position Task Book – Competency 1, Behavior 3, Tasks 2 & 3.

Capability 11: Planning

Capability Summary: Planning is the mechanism through which Federal, State, local and tribal governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures describing how they will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from Catastrophic events. Preparedness plans are drafted by a litany of organizations, agencies, and/or departments at all levels of government and within the private sector. Preparedness plans are not limited to those plans drafted by emergency management planners. The planning capability sets forth many of the activities and tasks undertaken by an Emergency Management planner when drafting (or updating) emergency management (preparedness) plans.

Observation 1: Hot washes were conducted each night with the State IMAT and District AHIMTs. Hot washes, or after action reviews, were conducted each evening to share findings and recommendations with appropriate personnel, using a no-fault problem-solving delivery format. Each hot wash enabled teams to analyze issues they had experienced over that operational period, and identify best practices and corrective actions for implementation, which resulted in refined and improved operations the following day. This also enabled teams to share lessons learned and institutional knowledge between teams, during transfers of command.

Analysis: Nearly every night, command and management personnel invested approximately 30 minutes to collectively review the operational period, and identify problems, solutions, best practices, and lessons learned. These sessions also fostered information sharing, which resulted in better situational awareness amongst the teams. In many cases, the time also proved to be therapeutic, as it gave team members the opportunity to share stories of the experiences gained during the incident.

Recommendation 1: Hot washes should be part of the regular regimen for all teams, when possible.

Recommendation 2: A standard agenda or format should be developed to help keep hot washes on-track, brief, succinct, and yet comprehensive, for all AHIMTs to follow.

Reference: IDHS All-Hazards Incident Commander Position Task Book – Competency 3, Behavior 1, Task 7.

Observation 2: The capability to effectively staff the SEOC Planning Section was reduced due to numerous staff members being on medical and military leave from work. New staff members were incorporated into the SEOC Planning Section and cross-trained to operate in multiple positions. Staff members who previously operated during SEOC activations required time to adjust to the working environment and become aware of their position responsibilities.

Analysis: The incorporation of new staff members into SEOC operations took time as on-the-job training was required. Crucial time was taken away from performing the position duties to educate the new personnel to the responsibilities and tasks they were assigned. Experience personnel also required time to become aware of their position specific responsibilities. The use of new staff, however, proved beneficial and critical to the SEOC operations as all key positions during operational periods were able to be staffed. Additional documentation and training for the SEOC Planning Section is necessary to ensure staff members can affectively perform the duties assigned to their position. An on-going training program for the Section will allow staff members to be well accustomed to performing duties as assigned in the SEOC.

Recommendation 1: Develop a SEOC Planning Section manual to include SOPs for each Planning Section position and document produced in the SEOC.

Recommendation 2: Develop depth in each of the SEOC Planning Sections through a sustained SEOC Planning Section training program to correlate with the existing SEOC training program. Ensure at minimum three deep on each position.

Reference: SEOC SOPs, SEOC Training Program.

Observation 3: The SEOC Planning Section GIS Specialist used the WebEOC Falcon mapping tool to plot the estimated path of the Henryville tornado using radar imagery analyzed by a GIS Specialist. This data was able to be plotted for IDHS use prior to the National Weather Service releasing the final path for the long-distance tornado that impacted Henryville, IN.

Analysis: A representative of the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) analyzed radar imagery obtained from the National Climatic Data Center. The imagery was used to plot the rotation signatures (estimated tornado position) as the storm crossed southern Indiana. The data collected was provided to IDHS. The IDHS GIS Specialist was able to plot these points on the Falcon map viewer within WebEOC. The estimated tornado path was able to be plotted against critical infrastructure and key resource locations in the adjacent and affected areas. This information aided in performing initial assessments of potentially impacted critical infrastructure including damage to the power sector. When the final tornado path was released by the National Weather Service, it was found to be within ¼ mile of the estimated path by the IDHS GIS Specialist.

Recommendation 1: Develop SOPs to make use of this technology standard within the IDHS GIS Section when tornados are suspected or confirmed to have produced damage. Use this technology immediately following a suspected tornado to plot the suspected tornado path and identify potentially impacted critical infrastructure.

Reference: National Climatic Data Center, Falcon WebEOC Map Viewer.

Observation 4: Information collected and disseminated in the Executive Summaries, Situation Reports and Incident Action Plans were incomplete at times. Planners were challenged by information collection from deployed personnel or other SEOC sections> As a result, data was not confirmed in a timely manner..

Analysis: The SEOC Planning Section staff need to ensure all information collected and disseminated is complete and that critical questions are addressed including “who”, “what”, “where”, “when”, “why” and “how”. Raw information must be confirmed and to enable the SEOC Policy Group to make informed decisions. Information gathered should *not* be disseminated until all questions are able to be answered. The SEOC Planning Section staff must utilize means of communications to ensure information passed on by other SEOC sections and field personnel is complete and accurate. Staff should not automatically assume information passed on is as detailed as possible if additional questions remain unanswered.

Recommendation 1: Make it standard practice for the SEOC PSC to remind SEOC Planning Section staff and all SEOC staff to ensure information collected and disseminated is accurate. Include in the proposed SEOC Planning Section handbook instructions to remind personnel during SEOC meetings and other briefings to ensure the best situational awareness is maintained. Include in planning section document SOPs language to ensure information being included in the document is complete and accurate.

Reference: SEOC SOPs, SEOC Planning Section Handbook (proposed)

Observation 5: The ESF-14 (Long-Term Recovery) position was staffed in the SEOC and volunteers deployed to the Henryville area after the SEOC was activated and the tornado had passed through the area. The Volunteers and Donations Management Plan was, however, not activated or referenced until approximately 48-72 hours into the SEOC activation.

Analysis: The Volunteers and Donations Management Plan was not immediately referenced and activated upon the SEOC Activation and response to the tornado incident in southern Indiana. The large amount of volunteers presenting themselves in the Henryville area proved too many to effectively manage and account for. By not activating the plan immediately and coordinating with the Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI), Henryville Incident Command Post and Clark County EOC, the process to track volunteers was not established until volunteers were actively working in the affected areas. New volunteers were able to be directed to register but already existing volunteers could not be fully engaged and accounted for.

Recommendation 1: Ensure the Volunteers and Donations Management Plan is

activated at the onset of any SEOC activation when the influx of volunteers to affected areas is highly probable.

Recommendation 2: Perform a review and revision of the Volunteers and Donations Management Plan with key stakeholders utilizing lessons learned from the Henryville tornado.

Reference: Volunteers and Donations Management Plan

Observation 6: Debris management became a primary objective for the Henryville Incident Command Post. Clark and Washington counties had a substantial amount of debris resulting in a delegation of authority from local officials to the State of Indiana to manage the overall debris management operations. The Indiana Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) and District Response Task Forces performed debris management operations utilizing state and local resources.

Analysis: After the initial 72 hours of response-oriented tasks, the Henryville Incident Command Post and Clark County EOC were tasked by local officials with the primary objective of debris management. The State IMAT and District Response Task Forces initiated debris management operations without the support and coordination from the SEOC. Use of the Debris Management Plan at the beginning of debris management operations could have aided in better tracking and coordination of operations between the State Emergency Operations Center, Clark County Emergency Operations Center and Henryville Incident Command Post.

Recommendation 1: Ensure the Debris Management Plan is immediately referenced and activated within the SEOC when disasters occur that result in a large amount of debris.

Recommendation 2: Ensure the IDHS Plans Matrix is referenced at the onset of a SEOC activation to allow for the reference and activation of any and all state emergency operations plans that are relevant to the ongoing incident. Include in the SEOC Planning Section handbook a task for the PSC to reference the matrix and activate relevant plans.

Recommendation 3: Perform a review and revision of the Debris Management Plan with key stakeholders utilizing lessons learned from the Henryville tornado.

Reference: Debris Management Plan

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

Responding to and recovering from any disaster can be overwhelming for local and state governments. In this case, Clark County Emergency Management Agency recognized very early the severity of the natural disaster and quickly initiated efforts to engage mutual aid and state-wide partners. Local and State first responder agencies did a tremendous job in responding to the communities that were struck, and the hard work, dedication and courage of all the first responders were the reason for the low death toll. Casualties were immediately rescued, provided medical assistance and transported. Law enforcement provided outstanding service, enforcing curfew and diligently seeking looters and other criminals who would attempt to take advantage of the situation.

Recovery is ongoing. Many homes that were destroyed are still being rebuilt, citizens are attempting to get back to a sense of normalcy and public agencies are providing necessary services for those who are rebuilding.

NIMS and ICS training should continue, with both public and private partners and stakeholders striving to participate as much as possible. Knowledge about disaster response and recovery will benefit those who seemed confused by the processes that were engaged during this disaster.

Proper review and updating of plans is critical to the disaster response and recovery processes. Ensuring stakeholders are aware of the plans, and training/exercising said stakeholders is a must for ensuring life-safety and property protection. Mitigation of problems experienced during this disaster will benefit residents, public employees and elected officials.

Knowing the severity or impact of a disaster is always challenging in the first few hours. Clark County has the resources to provide ongoing training, speedy assessments, search and rescue capabilities and mapping of impacted areas. Using current technology will be the key to responding to and recovering from the next disaster.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

This IP has been developed as a result of March 2, 2012 Tornado event. These recommendations draw on both the After Action Review and the After Action Conference. This improvement plan will draw on key recommendations and corrective actions identified from the September 11th, 2012 After Action Conference.

Capability	Observation Title	Recommendation	Corrective Action Description	Capability Element	Primary Responsible Agency	Agency POC	Start Date	Completion Date

Indiana Department of Homeland Security
Deliberative Material: Do Not Copy

After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP)

2012 March Tornado Activation
IDHS

APPENDIX B: LESSONS LEARNED

While the After Action Report/Improvement Plan includes recommendations which support development of specific post-event corrective actions, disaster events may also reveal lessons learned which can be shared with the broader homeland security audience. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains the *Lessons Learned Information Sharing* (LLIS.gov) system as a means of sharing post-event lessons learned with the emergency response community. This appendix provides jurisdictions and organizations with an opportunity to nominate lessons learned from events for sharing on *LLIS.gov*.

For reference, the following are the categories and definitions used in *LLIS.gov*:

- **Lesson Learned:** Knowledge and experience, positive or negative, derived from actual incidents, such as the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, as well as those derived from observations and historical study of operations, training, and exercises.
- **Best Practices:** Exemplary, peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or solutions that work and are solidly grounded in actual operations, training, and exercise experience.

Exercise Lessons Learned

While there were many best practices discovered during the tornado disaster, there were plenty of lessons learned as well, most of which have been captured in this document.

The more crucial areas where improvements can be made are with communications and proper EOC procedures. The Incident Command Post needs to ensure the County EOC is getting appropriate resource order requests so it is tracked in WebEOC and relayed to the State EOC. A communication guidance document should be created and implemented that will describe the proper communication channels for communicating during a disaster that can apply to any location in the state.

Communication should be more precise with all agencies (government, private sector, non-profit) so that everyone knows who is responsible for assignments during the disaster response. The best way for this to occur is to have a representative from each agency attend the operational period briefings and receive a copy of the Incident Action Plan (IAP).

Managing volunteers seems to be the most difficult challenge during this disaster. Proper training and plan production will alleviate most problems.

Best Practices

Initial response from the District Response Task Forces, Indiana Task Force 1, and State IMAT proved to be quick and effective. The application of the Incident Command System, including ICS forms, proved to be helpful in tracking the incident and expenses.

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS

Table F.1: Acronyms

ARC	American Red Cross
ASOF	Assistant Safety Officer
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
ESF	Emergency Support Functions
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FSC	Finance Section Chief
HIPPA	Health Insurance Privacy and Portability Act
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Command
ICS	Incident Command System
IDEM	Indiana Department of Environmental Management
IDHS	Indiana Department of Homeland Security
IMAT	Incident Management Assistance Team
IMT	Incident Management Team
ING	Indiana National Guard
ISDH	Indiana State Department of Health
ISP	Indiana State Police
JIC	Joint Information Center
LOFR	Liaison Officer
LSC	Logistics Section Chief (aka, “Logs”)
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OSC	Operations Section Chief
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PIO	Public Information Officer
POV	Personal Owned Vehicle
PSC	Planning Section Chief
SITL	Situation Unit Leader

**Indiana Department of Homeland Security
Deliberative Material: Do Not Copy**

**After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP)**

**2012 March Tornado Activation
IDHS**

SitRep	Situation Report
SOFR	Safety Officer
UC	Unified Command
VOAD	Volunteer Organizations Aiding in Disaster

APPENDIX D: WEATHER ASSESSMENTS

MARCH 6, 2012 WEATHER ASSESSMENT BY SITL



Weather Assessment
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Lauren Eickman-IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Rain in the Forecast for Clark County

The National Weather Service in Louisville has forecasted rain for Clark County including Henryville and Marysville on Thursday and into Friday.

A strong surface low will develop over the Southern Plains on Wednesday. It will head northeast developing a cold front that will lay across southern Indiana on Thursday. Models are showing that a large amount of rainfall is possible in these areas. The heavier amounts of rain could fall south of Indiana but nonetheless, heavy rainfall is still possible in this area.

Along with showers and heavy rainfall, a thunderstorm or two that is embedded within the system, will be possible. At this time, none of these storms are expected to be severe; however, dangerous lightning is always possible in any storm.

The rain should begin to clear early Friday afternoon as the cold front begins to move south. Friday night should remain clear. High temperatures will be in the 60s on Thursday and dropping to the 50s on Friday.

Total rainfall estimates at this time are 1 – 1.5 inches in the Clark County area. More could be forecasted in the future, but it is too early to tell at this time.

Current Weather Watches, Warnings, and Advisories:


- None for Clark County at this time.

Major threats at this time are

- Heavy rainfall
- Dangerous lightning in thunderstorms



Weather Assessment
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Lauren Eickman-IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security



5 Day Precipitation Forecast provided by the HPC.

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MARCH 7, 2012 WEATHER ASSESSMENT BY SITL



Weather Assessment
Tuesday, March 7, 2012
Lauren Eickman-IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Rain Still in the Forecast for Clark County

The National Weather Service in Louisville has forecasted gusty winds and heavy rain for tomorrow and into Friday morning.

Currently, a low pressure system is located over the Great Plains and Upper Midwest. Warm air will continue to pump warm air over the next several hours and temperatures should rise significantly into the upper 60s by the afternoon. Skies will continue to clear over the next several hours as well. Along with the warm temperatures and clear skies, winds are beginning to blow from the south and gusts could be strong at times. These winds will continue throughout most of the afternoon but expect it to taper down by the late afternoon.

For tonight, there is a slight chance of rain showers during the overnight hours. The timing of this rain will rapidly increase after midnight as a cold front associated with the low pressure moves northeast.

During the day on Thursday, the cold front will drop to the south and a second low pressure wave will bring the threat for heavy rains throughout the entire day. Rain will be expected to begin in the late morning hours and last through Friday morning. By Friday afternoon, 1-1.5 inches of rain could be expected. The National Weather Service has indicated they are not deeply concerned about the flooding threat other than very minor and localized flooding. The threat for thunderstorms has moved south so not concerned about the threat of strong thunderstorms, although southerly winds could be strong.




Weather Assessment
Tuesday, March 7, 2012
Lauren Eickman-IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Current Weather Watches, Warnings, and Advisories:

- None for Clark County at this time.

Major threats at this time are

- Heavy rainfall
- Gusty winds



5 Day Precipitation Forecast provided by the HPC.

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MARCH 8, 2012 WEATHER ASSESSMENT BY SITL

 Weather Assessment
Thursday, March 8, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Clark County Rain

Rain is currently falling over Clark County and is forecasted to continue over the next several hours.

Currently, a cold front is moving across Indiana and is bringing the threat for more heavy rain and possibly a thunderstorm. A line of heavier rain and perhaps some lightning is moving across the Indiana state line and heading east-southeast. This line of heavier rain could impact Clark County in about an hour, however; models are starting to show this line dissipating.

During the afternoon hours and into the early evening, expect rain showers to taper off and become scattered. Some pockets of heavier rain are still possible. Winds will continue to be strong at times but not as strong as yesterday. Winds could gust as high as 30 mph from the southwest.

In total, about .075 to 1 inch of rain is possible over the area. Major flooding is still not a concern at this time and any flooding that does occur will be very localized and minor.


Current Weather Watches, Warnings, and Advisories:

- None for Clark County at this time.

Major threats at this time are

- Heavy rainfall
- Gusty winds

 Weather Assessment
Thursday, March 8, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security



5 Day Precipitation Forecast provided by the HPC.

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MARCH 10, 2012 WEATHER ASSESSMENT BY SITL

 Weather Assessment
Saturday, March 10, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

More Rain in the Forecast

Another round of showers and possibly a thunderstorm or two is forecasted for Sunday night and most of the day on Monday. The Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (HPC) has forecasted about a 0.50 to 0.75 inches of rain from Sunday night and into Monday night. Since this rain is not expected to be heavy and will be spread out throughout a longer period of time, flooding is not expected.

Today and tomorrow look to be beautiful, with sunny skies and temperatures on the rise. By Sunday evening, a low pressure system will begin to move in from southwest and bring widespread showers and perhaps a thunderstorm or two and ending by Monday night. At this time, storms do not look to be severe.

By Tuesday, skies will become clear and temperatures will still be on the rise reaching into the mid to upper 70s by Wednesday.


Current Weather Watches, Warnings, and Advisories:

- None for Clark and Washington counties at this time.

Totals and Timing

- 0.50 – 0.75 inches of rain
- Beginning Sunday night and lasting into Monday night.

 Weather Assessment
Saturday, March 10, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security



Days 1-3 Precipitation Forecast provided by the HPC.

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MARCH 11, 2012 WEATHER ASSESSMENT BY SITL



Weather Assessment
Saturday, March 10, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

More Rain in the Forecast

Another round of showers and possibly a thunderstorm or two is forecasted for Sunday night and most of the day on Monday. The Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (HPC) has forecasted about a 0.50 to 0.75 inches of rain from Sunday night and into Monday night. Since this rain is not expected to be heavy and will be spread out throughout a longer period of time, flooding is not expected.

Today and tomorrow look to be beautiful, with sunny skies and temperatures on the rise. By Sunday evening, a low pressure system will begin to move in from southwest and bring widespread showers and perhaps a thunderstorm or two and ending by Monday night. At this time, storms do not look to be severe.

By Tuesday, skies will become clear and temperatures will still be on the rise reaching into the mid to upper 70s by Wednesday.

Current Weather Watches, Warnings, and Advisories:


- None for Clark and Washington counties at this time.

Totals and Timing

- 0.50 – 0.75 inches of rain
- Beginning Sunday night and lasting into Monday night.



Weather Assessment
Sunday, March 11, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security



Days 1- 2 Precipitation Forecast provided by the HPC.

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MARCH 15, 2012 WEATHER ASSESSMENT BY SITL



Weather Assessment
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Slight Risk for Severe Storms

The Storm Prediction Center (SPC) has issued a slight risk of severe storms for all of southern Indiana including Clark and Washington counties. This slight risk has been issued for the chance of strong to severe storms during the afternoon hours and into the evening today.

At this time, scattered thunderstorms that impacted parts of our area earlier this morning are moving off to the east. Currently, there are no thunderstorms behind them, so expect skies to clear up relatively quickly.

While the skies become clear, expect temperatures to rise as well. The high temperature will still stay around 78 degrees. Along with the temperatures, instability in the atmosphere will increase which will cause scattered thunderstorms to pop up in the late afternoon hours. These thunderstorms could produce gusty winds and marginal sized hail.

During the evening, expect these thunderstorms to continue until 11pm. Skies will then become mostly cloudy with temperatures dropping into the upper 50s.

There is another chance of scattered showers and thunderstorms tomorrow. Gusty winds and hail could be possible with these storms as well.

Current Weather Watches, Warnings, and Advisories:

- None for Clark and Washington counties at this time.

Major Threats at This Time:

- Gusty winds and hail
- Dangerous lightning



Weather Assessment
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Lauren Eickman- IMAT
Indiana Department of Homeland Security



The Storm Prediction Center has issued a slight risk of severe storms for southern Indiana.

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MARCH 2, 2012 TORNADO EVENT



CLARK COUNTY
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY



AFTER ACTION REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN

June 8, 2012

ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

4. The title of this document is March 2, 2012 Tornado Event.
5. The information gathered in this AAR/IP is classified as For Official Use Only (FOUO) and should be handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and stored in accordance with appropriate security directives. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval from the Clark County Emergency Management Agency is prohibited.
6. At a minimum, the attached materials will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis and when unattended, will be stored in a locked container or area offering sufficient protection against theft, compromise, inadvertent access, and unauthorized disclosure.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Clark County lies on the north bank of the Ohio River directly across the river from Louisville, Kentucky. Clark County's population is 110,232 (2010 U.S. Census). The county seat is Jeffersonville. According to the 2010 census, the county has a total area of 376.45 square miles, of which 372.86 square miles is land and 3.60 square miles is water.

There are six cities and towns within Clark County: Borden, Charlestown, Clarksville, Jeffersonville, Sellersburg and Utica. There are 12 unincorporated towns: Bethlehem, Hamburg, Henryville, Marysville, Memphis, Nabb, New Washington, Oak Park, Otisco, Speed, Starlight, and Watson. Clark County has 12 established townships. There are two major interstates (I-65 and I-265) as well as one U.S. highway. Remaining roads consist of state and county roads. Clark County has three public school districts and four private schools, along with three colleges and universities.

Clark County is vulnerable to a wide range of natural, manmade, and technological hazards. Periodic disasters resulting from floods, tornadoes, winter storms, and other catastrophic events cause injuries and loss of life, disruption of services, and the possibility of significant property damage in any community within the County. Such events may also have negative impacts on the areas in which they occur long after the event has taken place. Major disasters such as 1998 Charlestown tire fire, the 1997 Ohio River flood, and the 1993 Colgate Oleum fire have heightened Indiana's awareness to the idea that all Hoosiers are vulnerable to such events. Managing these various threats and protecting life and property are challenges faced by emergency management personnel at all levels of government.

On March 2, 2012, Mother Nature struck Clark County with a fury unseen since 1990. Tornadoes struck the county at approximately 3:09pm and left the county at 3:26pm. The National Weather Service (NWS) in Louisville provided an EF-4 rating of the tornado, with winds in excess of 175 mph. The tornado first entered Clark County at the Washington County – Clark County line just east of South Flatwood Road, and departed the county at the Scott County line just east of Nabb, located on State Highway 362. The tornado path was 17.0 miles across the county and almost a half-mile wide.

The National Weather Service in conjunction with Clark County Emergency Management conducted an exhaustive tornado damage survey on Saturday and Sunday, March 3 and 4. Below are the results. The tornado continued east-northeast in far northwest Clark County on Dan Gray Road where the twister leveled many well-built homes and caused extensive tree damage. The tornado here was rated EF4 with estimated wind speeds of 170 mph and a damage width of one-third mile.

The tornado moved into far southeast Washington County before reappearing in Clark County. In Clark, the damage width narrowed to one-quarter mile as the tornado crossed Pixley Knob Road and decreased in intensity to EF2 with wind speeds of 115-120 mph.

Further east, the tornado intensified again as it destroyed two double wide homes on Speith Road. One family residence on the west side of the road was severely damaged, reflecting EF3 damage with 150 mph winds.

The tornado crossed Interstate 65, damaging several vehicles and semis and closing the interstate for several hours. Several people were trapped in these vehicles, but were later rescued.

The tornado continued to strengthen just east of Exit 19 Interstate 65 in a heavily industrialized area. Here, buildings containing several businesses were severely damaged. A home was destroyed on the east side of North Fraucke Road. The violent tornado also seriously damaged several homes on the north side of State Highway 160. Here, there was evidence of multi-vortex structure with EF4 damage and 175 mph estimated winds.

The tornado then struck the south buildings of the Henryville middle and high school complex, with severe damage and 170 mph winds (EF4). The middle school experienced the worst damage. The cafeteria was completely destroyed. Two school buses were ripped off their chassis.

There was also extensive structural damage on the east side of Henryville on North Front Street and Pennsylvania Street. A high tension tower and other homes were damaged on Pine Drive. Incredible tree damage also occurred just west of Pine Drive as the tornado traveled up a ridge. In this region, the tornado was an EF3 with 150 mph winds.

On Brownstown Road, many homes were severely damaged especially on the north side of the tornado track with estimated speeds of 150 mph (EF3). Farther east, there was massive deforestation on the east side of a ridge just west of and along Henryville-Otisco Road. Several more homes were severely damaged along this road. One of these homes reflected EF4 damage and 170 mph winds.

The tornado rapidly narrowed to a rope-like structure and ended as an EF1 with 90-95 mph winds and an 80 yard wide path. This occurred near the intersection of Blackberry Trail and State Highway 3.

Simultaneously, a new cyclic tornado vortex rapidly formed from the same supercell near Mahan Road and Old State Road 3 immediately southwest of the first tornado. The second tornado began as an EF1 and damaged a church and a few trees. The vortex quickly intensified to EF3 strength as it crossed the south portion of the town of Marysville, severely damaging several homes.

East of Marysville, another cyclic vortex from the parent storm formed just southwest of the intersection of Nabb New Washington Road and Nabb Marysville Road. This vortex intensified and merged with the primary circulation. The tornado severely damaged or destroyed several houses and double wide mobile homes around the intersection of Nabb New Washington and

Nabb Marysville. Debris from the double wides were tossed around a mile downwind. The tornado was rated EF3 here with 150 mph winds and a damage width of one-third mile.

A Civil Air Patrol flight on Sunday, March 4 revealed extensive ground scouring in farmers' fields east of Marysville all the way to the Jefferson-Scott County line. This scouring was evidence of a multi-vortex tornado, which was confirmed by multiple videos and photographs.

The tornado continued north of Barnes Road, damaging several clusters of trees in open country. The tornado intensified east of the intersection of Kettle Bottom and State Highway 362.

In Scott County, immediately north of Highway 362 and east of Concord Road, three homes were severely damaged while five double wide mobile homes were completely destroyed. Here, the tornado was an EF4 with 170 mph winds. Just south of 362 in Clark County, two additional homes and power poles were damaged greatly. From there, the tornado crossed into Jefferson County, Indiana.

A close-up of the tornado tracks through Henryville. The white track with red border is the EF-4 tornado from the first supercell. Note the evidence of multiple vortices developing to the south of the main tornado and wrapping into the larger circulation. The school campus is just northwest of the intersection of Ferguson St. and IN 160. The yellow track is the EF-1 from the second supercell. It's pretty rare to have two tornadoes pass through the same town within an hour of each other!



Due to the extensive training and skills within the first responder communities, as well as the quick reaction of fire, EMS and law enforcement, fatalities were minimized as victims were transported or treated on site with swift care.

Major Strengths

The major strengths identified during this disaster are as follows:

- State-wide Mutual Aid / District Response Task Forces response
- Local first responder response / life safety
- Deployments of American Red Cross and Salvation Army
- Health Department response and assistance from surrounding counties
- REMC cooperation and assistance
- Emergency Operations Center (EOC) performance
- Integrated Public Safety Commission (IPSC) response
- Law enforcement response / full recall
- Debris Management Plan and implementation

Primary Areas for Improvement

Throughout the disaster, several opportunities for improvement in Clark County's ability to respond to the incident were identified. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

- Volunteer Management (civilians): Within the first few days there were 840 new registered American Red Cross volunteers. Overall, approximately 5,000 volunteers arrived to lend assistance any way they could. After a few days of confusion with civilian volunteers, the Incident Command in Henryville created a "Humanitarian Coordinator" at the IC to handle. There was only one volunteer registration center available and it was several miles from the nearest disaster area. Many volunteers who arrived in the disaster area were put off by having to travel further away just to register. In the future, the Humanitarian coordinator function can be handled by the ESF-6 representative(s) in the county EOC. The county CEMP will be revised to reflect this update as well as coordination with ARC, Salvation Army and United Way. Additional registration points can be established closer to the disaster zone, especially when there is a wide area to cover. As well, a dedicated person(s) should be trained to assist with completing forms, checklists and other paperwork necessary for reporting to the Auditor. These recommendations should assist with timely reporting to the county Auditor's office.
- Volunteer Management (first responders): There were many fire, law enforcement and EMS that self-deployed to the affected areas to assist. Unfortunately, there was

no plan established early on to organize or manage the self-deployed personnel. Clark County Emergency Management will establish an SOP, outlining a specific staging area and key personnel to manage and provide accountability of outside agencies. Incident Command will be periodically informed as to what assets and personnel are available at the staging area and IC will make decisions to use based on need. A staging manager can be trained and utilized to manage all first responder registrations. A means to provide single type credentialing for all first responders in Clark County should be established as soon as possible. A credentialing system should also be implemented at the staging area for outside personnel/resources.

- Food Management: Many food service providers and citizens provided an influx of prepared food and drinks for citizens and first responders. There were several first responders that became ill most likely due to food poisoning or improperly prepared food items. Local health department should create a plan for handling emergency food preparations. The Plan should include information that establishes that first responders should not eat foods that have not been inspected by the health department. A potential partnership with the local food / restaurant association(s) could be established and possibly engage the association during disaster to assist with management of incoming foods.
- Unclear Chain of Command / Span of Control: Some agencies expressed concern because they were not sure where or who IC was and how the interaction between them and IC should be demonstrated. All agencies with a potential to respond to disasters, whether public or private, should complete the National Incident Management System (NIMS) training to learn about incident command. Clark County EMA can provide information bulletins to agencies that will assist them in completing training, most of which is FREE and on-line. All EOC personnel who are rostered members of emergency support functions (ESF's) should also take the necessary training, up to and including ICS-300. Clark County EMA can also provide a "training calendar" to local agencies of upcoming training, both in and out of the county.
- Shelter / Transportation needs: Many residents lost their homes and vehicles during the disaster. There was concern that shelters were too far away and there were not enough vehicles to assist in transporting victims. A shelter was established at Country Lakes Resort, owned and operated by the Southeastern Christian Church. This facility was not equipped with the needs that come with a shelter, but within days there was enough support and equipment to make the facility operational. Country Lakes is several miles from the disaster zone. American Red Cross should identify several suitable shelters within the county and establish agreements with property owners.
- Debris hindering responders: REMC and fire/EMS personnel had difficulty initially with getting through some roadways due to debris. REMC's responsibility is to secure power where downed lines occur, as well as restore power for life-sustaining and safety as soon as possible. One recommendation is to coordinate efforts between

- REMC and the county/state highway departments, meeting periodically to update or create response plans that incorporate priority for emergency roadway clearances.
- Communications: During the first hours of the disaster, radio communications were overwhelmed and most responders could not use the 800Mhz system. There are 137 talk-groups assigned to the Henryville tower, and only a few were utilized. Also, re-banding of many radios were in progress at the time of the disaster. 911 operators received over 840 calls within the first hours of the disaster. While there is a Crisis Communications Plan, many local agencies either did not know about the plan or failed to follow the plan. Most responders stayed on the frequencies that they use on a day-to-day basis. Dispatchers could not hear fire elements, and when they attempted to communicate with them, there was no response due to the heavy volume. One solution that can resolve this when an agency or department is dispatched and no copy is received, dispatchers should assume the agency/department has been rendered “unavailable or damaged beyond capabilities” and begin mutual aid dispatches. The Clark County Communications Department is currently working with IPSC on many of the issues that arose. As well, a plan or Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) could be developed for 911 dispatchers that provide guidance on which channels they could direct users to use, keeping many local responders on talk-around groups and not using the repeater. Once IPSC arrived on scene the next day, radio traffic was relieved and usable.
 - RACES: There is no antenna at the Clark County EOC located in Sellersbug. However, the group does have a portable antenna that was used once the EOC was established at the REMC facility. The Clark County EMA will continue to search for grant funding that can provide an appropriate antenna for RACES personnel. Also, the RACES members did not know that the IDHS and District 9 Mobile Communications Vehicles had amateur radio capabilities. District 9 (and all districts in Indiana) should establish an SOP for their mobile communications vehicles that incorporate using local RACES personnel, and provide training on the systems.
 - Incident Command/Unified Command: As is the case in every disaster, initial chaos occurs early on until assessments can be made and response crews can respond on scene. This disaster was no different. Within eight hours after the tornadoes, unified command was established in Henryville. While there was some initial confusion as to the scope of responsibility and span of control with the unified command, the implementation of NIMS and the use of operational Incident Action Plans provided a clearer picture of responsibility. Although the IAPs were provided during each 8:00am operations briefing, several private and volunteer agencies were not provided them. Ensuring copies are provided to each ESF in the county EOC is essential for disseminating the necessary information to the field.
 - Search and Rescue: Initial efforts were chaotic and duplication of efforts occurred due to many of the first responders not knowing the proper procedures for searching structures. Many first responders did not mark structures after they were searched, and most reported that they either did not know they were supposed to or didn't have

paint cans available. One solution is to provide every first responder vehicle, whether law enforcement, EMS or fire, with a properly colored can of spray paint. A county SOP or plan should be established that outlines search criteria, and first responders should be provided training on search and rescue awareness.

- One-Stop-Shops: American Red Cross was unclear as to their role at the OSS center located at the Ivy Tech campus in Sellersburg. They felt there should be a larger role in operating the OSS. IDHS has historically run the OSS locations throughout Indiana and constantly works on the OSS concept to improve after each disaster. A recommendation is to have ARC and IDHS meet to discuss operations and roles.
- Damage Assessments: Over 150 damage assessments were conducted within the first 72 hours after the tornadoes struck. Clark County has a Damage Assessment team that has been trained and equipped with FEMA/IDHS street sheets, various forms, and cameras. However, many of the members were either working in another capacity at the disaster zone or had to work for their employer. Also, there were not enough detailed maps to be used by those who did conduct damage assessments. A solution to this could be to identify personnel who will be available when needed, such as the county CERT or other local group. Training should be ongoing with the Damage Assessment team, with an annual exercise provided. County GIS maps should be readily available, and location maps of areas to be assessed should be quickly available to print.
- FEMA Reimbursement: There is confusion on which first responder agencies are eligible for federal disaster relief. The Clark County attorney and IDHS Recovery Division is currently working the issue with FEMA, as the state-wide mutual aid agreement should provide relief to most agencies based on verbiage. Further information is forthcoming.

While there is always room for improvement with every event or disaster, the overall response and recovery within Clark County was exceptional. The courage and dedication of every member who responded during the initial search and rescue, response and ongoing incident management was an example that the entire country can follow. Many things went right during this disaster, and the fact that only one fatality was recorded after such a significant natural disaster is a tribute to the first responders who work and train daily in Clark County.

SECTION 1: EVENT OVERVIEW

Event Details

Incident Name

March 2, 2012 Tornado Event

Type of Incident

Natural Disaster / Tornadoes and storms

Incident Start Date

March 2, 2012

Incident End Date

March 20, 2012

Duration

Thirty 12-Hour Operational Periods

Location

Throughout Clark County: Unified Command /Henryville

Mission

Protect lives, search and rescue, emergency response, recovery

Capabilities

Fire suppression, law enforcement and physical security, emergency medical and transport, search and rescue, mass sheltering, health and human services,

Participating Organizations

Clark County

- Clark County Emergency Management Agency
- Clark County Board of Commissioners
- Clark County Council
- Clark County Auditor's Office
- Clark County Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
- Clark County Sheriff's Dept.
- Clark County Health Dept.
- Monroe Twp. Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Jeffersonville Fire Dept.
- Jeffersonville Police Dept.
- Clarksville Fire Dept.
- Clarksville Police Dept.
- Sellersburg Fire Dept.
- Sellersburg Police Dept.
- Rural Metro Ambulance
- Yellow Ambulance

Mutual Aid

- New Albany Police Dept.
- New Albany Fire Dept.
- Floyd County Sheriff's Dept.
- Lafayette Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Georgetown Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Greenville Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Harrison Twp. Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Utica Volunteer Fire Dept.
- New Chapel Volunteer Fire/EMS
- Miltown Police Dept.
- Harrods Creek Volunteer Fire Dept.
- Floyd County Emergency Management Agency
- Floyd County Health Dept.
- Harrison County Emergency Management Agency

State of Indiana

- Indiana Department of Homeland Security
- Indiana State Police
- Indiana Department of Natural Resources
- Indiana State Dept. of Health
- Indiana Task Force One
- Indiana National Guard

Federal

- FEMA Region 5

VOADs

- Adventist Disaster Response
- Three Nails
- UMCORP United Methodist Church
- Catholic Charities
- Clark County American Red Cross
- Metro United Way
- Purdue Extension

SECTION 2: CONCLUSION


Responding to and recovering from any disaster can be overwhelming for local and state governments. In this case, Clark County Emergency Management Agency recognized very early the severity of the natural disaster and quickly initiated efforts to engage mutual aid and state-wide partners. Local first responder agencies did a tremendous job in responding to the communities that were struck, and the hard work, dedication and courage of all the first responders were the reason for the low death toll. Casualties were immediately rescued, provided medical assistance and transported. Law enforcement provided outstanding service, enforcing curfew and diligently seeking looters and other criminals who would attempt to take advantage of the situation.

Recovery is ongoing. Many homes that were destroyed are still being rebuilt, citizens are attempting to get back to a sense of normalcy and public agencies are providing necessary services for those who are rebuilding.

NIMS and ICS training should continue, with both public and private partners and stakeholders striving to participate as much as possible. Knowledge about disaster response and recovery will benefit those who seemed confused by the processes that were engaged during this disaster.

Proper review and updating of plans is critical to the disaster response and recovery processes. Ensuring stakeholders are aware of the plans, and training/exercising said stakeholders is a must for ensuring life-safety and property protection. Mitigation of problems experienced during this disaster will benefit residents, public employees and elected officials.

Knowing the severity or impact of a disaster is always challenging in the first few hours. Clark County has the resources to provide ongoing training, speedy assessments, search and rescue capabilities and mapping of impacted areas. Using current technology will be the key to responding to and recovering from the next disaster.



APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

This IP has been developed specifically for Clark County, Indiana and all jurisdictions as a result of March 2, 2012 Tornado event. These recommendations draw on both the After Action Review and the After Action Conference. This improvement plan will draw on key recommendations and corrective actions identified from the May 24, 2012 After Action Conference.

Capability	Observation Title	Recommendation	Corrective Action Description	Capability Element	Primary Responsible Agency	Agency POC	Start Date	Completion Date
Volunteer Management	1. Limited Volunteer Registration Locations	1.1 Coordination and support provided by the county EOC, ESF-6 desk.	1.1.1 Revise the County CEMP ESF-6 Checklist	Planning	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	July 1, 2012	Sep 1, 2012
			1.1.2 Coordinate with local volunteer organizations	Planning	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	July 1, 2012	Aug 1, 2012
		1.2 Support multiple registration sites depending on the size and scope of disaster.	1.2.1 Standard Operating Procedures created by lead agency	Planning	American Red Cross	Chapter Director	July 1, 2012	Sep 1, 2012
			1.2.2 Dedicate personnel to be trained and manage task	Training	American Red Cross	Chapter Director	July 1, 2012	Dec 1, 2012
			2.1.2 Provide one credentialing system for all county/local first responders	Systems/ Equipment	Clark County Government	County Commissioners / Council	Jul 1, 2012	Jun 30, 2013
Food	3. Some	3.1 Create or	3.1.1 Establish	Planning	Clark County	Health Director	Jul	Sep 1,

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**After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP)**

**2012 March Tornado Activation
IDHS**

Management	private food donations caused illness	revise existing plan(s) addressing food inspections	procedures for inspections of all foods given to first responders		Health Dept.		1, 2012	2012
			3.1.2 Coordinate / engage local restaurant associations for assistance	Planning	Clark County Health Dept.	Health Director	Jul 1, 2012	Dec 1, 2012
Chain of Command / Span of Control	4. Unclear roles and responsibilities	4.1 Complete NIMS and ICS training	4.1.1 Create a Clark County <i>Three Year Training Plan</i> and calendar	Training	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	Jul 1, 2012	Oct 1, 2012
Shelter and Transportation	5. Shelters too far from disaster zone	5.1 Identify multiple shelter locations within Clark County	5.1.1 Create partnerships with private and non-profit agencies, establish multiple shelter locations	Planning / Response	American Red Cross	Chapter Director	Jul 1, 2012	Jan 1, 2013
	6. Not enough transportation to shelters and OSS locations	6.1 Increase transportation availability	6.1.1 Create partnerships with private and non-profit agencies, establish multiple modes of mass transit	Planning / Response	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	Jul 1, 2012	Jan 1, 2013
Debris Management	7. Debris hindered utilities and first responder	7.1 Review Plans / Procedures	7.1.1 Conduct committee meetings with REMC, Clark	Planning	Clark County Hwy.	Hwy Superintendent	Jul 1, 2012	Jan 1, 2013

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**After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP)**

**2012 March Tornado Activation
IDHS**

	crews		County Hwy. and INDOT to ensure plans are in place and working					
Communications	8. 800MHz Overload	8.1 Review Crisis Communications Plan	8.1.1 Review and revise plan, distribute to all first responder agencies	Planning	Clark County Communications	Comms Director	Jul 1, 2012	Jan 1, 2013
		8.2 Create Standard Operating Procedure for Dispatchers	8.2.1 Ensure dispatchers are aware and trained to disseminate talk-group info to first responders during crisis	Planning / Operations	Clark County Communications	Comms Director	Sep 1, 2012	Jan 1, 2013
		8.3 Provide ongoing training to first responders	8.3.1 Each first response agency conduct radio communications training ongoing	Training	All Agencies Involved	Agency Heads	Jul 1, 2012	Ongoing
	9. RACES	9.1 No radio antenna at Clark County EOC	9.1.1 Secure funding for antenna	Comms	Clark County RACES	RACES Chief	Jul 1, 2012	Dec 1, 2012
Search and Rescue	10. Duplication of Efforts	10.1 Responders who conducted searches did not mark structures or marked incorrectly	10.1.1 Provide proper marking paint in every first response vehicle	Logistics	All Agencies Involved	Agency Heads	Jul 1, 2012	Oct 1, 2012
			10.1.2 Conduct county-wide Search and	Training	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	Oct 1, 2012	Mar 1, 2013

**Indiana Department of Homeland Security
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**After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP)**

**2012 March Tornado Activation
IDHS**

			Rescue Awareness level training					
Damage Assessments	11. Not enough trained personnel available	11.1 Existing damage assessment team members not available due to other tasks/jobs	11.1.1 Seek volunteers who are able to be called within a 24 hour notice to conduct damage assessments	Operations	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	Jul 1, 2012	Nov 1, 2012
			11.1.2 Provide IDHS level damage assessment training to volunteer members	Training	Clark County EMA / IDHS	EMA Director / District 9 Coord	Jul 1, 2012	Mar 1, 2013
			11.1.3 Create "go kits" for each member	Logistics	Clark County EMA	EMA Director	Jul 1, 2012	Mar 1, 2013

Table A.1: Improvement Plan Matrix

APPENDIX B: LESSONS LEARNED

While the After Action Report/Improvement Plan includes recommendations which support development of specific post-event corrective actions, disaster events may also reveal lessons learned which can be shared with the broader homeland security audience. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains the *Lessons Learned Information Sharing* (LLIS.gov) system as a means of sharing post-event lessons learned with the emergency response community. This appendix provides jurisdictions and organizations with an opportunity to nominate lessons learned from events for sharing on *LLIS.gov*.

For reference, the following are the categories and definitions used in *LLIS.gov*:

- **Lesson Learned:** Knowledge and experience, positive or negative, derived from actual incidents, such as the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, as well as those derived from observations and historical study of operations, training, and exercises.
- **Best Practices:** Exemplary, peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or solutions that work and are solidly grounded in actual operations, training, and exercise experience.

Exercise Lessons Learned

While there were many best practices discovered during the tornado disaster, there were plenty of lessons learned as well, most of which have been captured in this document.

The more crucial areas where improvement can be made is with communications procedures and equipment. By implementing a policy with emergency communications / 911 that provides procedures for dispatchers to “move” radio traffic to specific talk groups, this could lessen the burden on the 800 system, thus reducing “busy signals” for users.

Communication should be more precise with all agencies (government, private sector, non-profit) so that everyone knows who is responsible for assignments during the disaster response. The best way for this to occur is to have a representative from each agency attend the operational period briefings and receive a copy of the Incident Action Plan (IAP).

Managing volunteers seems to be the most difficult challenge during this disaster. Proper training and plan production will alleviate most problems.

Best Practices

Initial response by Clark County Management, local fire elements and law enforcement’s ability to identify and request outside resources attributed to a faster response and recovery for the affected areas. District Response Task Force teams from around the state of Indiana provided Incident Command quickly, and maintained command and control throughout the next few weeks.


County Commissioners, Monroe Twp. Trustee and county highway personnel were able to quickly estimate the amount of debris in the county. This attributed to a “fast-track” contract with a local vendor to accomplish debris management and removal.

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS

Table F.1: *Acronyms*

NIMS	National Incident Management System
ICS	Incident Command System
IC	Incident Command
UC	Unified Command
IAP	Incident Action Plan
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
IDHS	Indiana Department of Homeland Security
ARC	American Red Cross
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
ISP	Indiana State Police
ING	Indiana National Guard
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
ESF	Emergency Support Functions
VOAD	Volunteer Organizations Aiding in Disaster
ISDH	Indiana State Department of Health

District 2 Task Force Deployment After Action Report



Clark County Tornadoes: March 9th-March 16th, 2012

District 2 Task Force Deployment After-Action Report

Incident: Clark County Tornados

Report Purpose:

On April 4th, 2012 a group of District 2 responders gathered at the Marshall County Building in Plymouth, Indiana to discuss their recent deployment to Southern Indiana to assist in the tornado recovery efforts. The following report is a collection of the lessons learned, best practices, and needs for improvement suggested and discussed amongst the responders who deployed.

Opening remarks:

The meeting began at approximately 8:07am and was called to order by Task Force Commander, Ron Patrick. Commander Patrick began by commending the efforts of all those involved and then proceeded to explain the purpose of the meeting. Commander Patrick noted Ed Rock would be acting as a facilitator in the meeting process and was there to help keep the discussion on point and productive. Responders were to state their names, offer a summary of their thought, and identify a potential solution when applicable. Ed Rock stated the focus of the discussion should be on 3 objectives; Policy, Equipment, and Training

The following information is a collection of the thoughts and suggestions from the meeting broken down by category and by whom the suggestion or observation was made.

POSITIVES

Sherry Fagner- Good policy in place for rostering and mobilizing, equipment was accessible throughout the district, and critical information was able to be taken on hard drives.

Ron Patrick- Equipment purchased by the District was an excellent resource. Gators were invaluable in the field for basic transportation in the area.

Mike Compton- Deployment process went well despite not having all members on the roster in advance. Also commented on the benefit of working with fellow District 2 Personnel; requests had more validity because of the personal relationships previously established. The overall convoy process seemed quicker and more efficient. Having nightly after actions or “hot washes” was valuable to boots on the ground personnel. Also the IMT benefited from the initial shadowing period with the IMT personnel already in place.

Mike Pennington- Professionalism amongst everyone was outstanding even while functioning outside of their everyday capacities.

Ron Patrick- IMT members were all very familiar with each other, which was a residual benefit of the San Diego Incident Management Conference.

Matt Pitney- Deployment helped to get more personnel rostered. Real world events help to stress the importance of getting applications in ahead of time so that the district can be mission ready.

Ron Patrick- Deputy Commander did an outstanding job in the early stages in prepping the task force for a potential deployment in his absence.

Gary Horvath- State did a great job assisting with making sure the 800 MHz system was working properly

TRAINING

Mike Compton- suggests providing a refresher course for deploying personnel in NIMS forms

Dan Sink- suggested having some 214 forms available at the mob site and offering a 20 minute briefing/training on what info is needed and how to properly document all the required information

Ken Miller-suggested there are some online NIMS forms training

Ted Bombagetti- Debris management training needs to be made available to both IMT and Task Force members

Jen Tobey- Suggests all task force members review the requirements in the position specific task books and be sure they are meeting all training requirements.

Jen Tobey- Need to look for training on EOC procedures, request flows, State-Local coordination

Matt Pitney- Suggests the district sends individuals to COMT class to give additional communication skills capabilities.

Clyde Avery- Need some specific training for 213 and 214 forms. Documentation could have been cleaner during deployment, which can slow down the flow of resources.

Matt Pitney- Suggests staging area training so that the resource branch can function more efficiently

BEST PRACTICES

Dan Sink- shadowing period for IMT should be made a regular best practice as it proved

invaluable. Also, operationally, integrating a Humanitarian Services Branch to manage and coordinate volunteer efforts should be a regular practice for the IMT.

Dan Sink- Fire core should deploy with a mechanically sound and knowledgeable person to inspect local equipment that could be used by District Task Force personnel to ensure it is operational and safe

AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT

Clyde Avery- Policy Issue- When the task force is requested, each element should have a minimum set number of personnel required to deploy safely and it should not be deviated from.

Dan Sink- Also agreed that the Task Force needs to drive the amount of personnel needed to safely and effectively respond. The State should not be forcing the deployment number down.

Ron Patrick- Frustrated that the State set the maximum number of deployable personnel based on available lodging when the task force could have brought down its own self sufficient base camp.

Jen Tobey- suggests pushing the State to work with EOC personnel as the details of the deployment given to task force leadership changed too rapidly and drastically. The task force needs a better and clearer picture of the incident prior to accepting the mission.

Dan Sink- More personnel could have been sent down to assist with the food services branch.

Jim Lopez- Laptops, printers, etc... need to be standardized and identical information needs to be carried by all IMT members on flash drives. Also, need to purchase quality equipment to ensure it has longevity and won't need replaced as often.

Sherry Fagner- Need to be sure all task force computers and other pieces of technology are opened and updated on a regular basis so they are ready to utilize whenever needed. Laptops especially need to run updates so they are not trying to update on scene while attempting to be used.

Jaren Killian- Need to be sure the Task Force deploys with some dedicated EMS staff to provide care to D2 personnel in the event of a problem.

Sherry Fagner- Finance Section - Incorporate state reimbursement documentation from the beginning of deployments, also collaborate with the state to have consistency of forms.

Communication on expectations from state to the District as well as communication from District to the responding agencies will speed up the reimbursement process.

POLICY CHANGES

Jen Tobey- Elkhart County will be changing the policy for the Mobile Command to reflect sending two trained personnel with the asset. Also the fee schedule will be changing for use of the asset after the first 24 hours.

Dan Sink- Suggests having a policy in place to designate a person to print maps of the area prior to deploying as maps were not as readily available as they should have been.

Sherry Fagner- suggested a policy be put in place establishing a maintenance plan for the task force technology equipment.

Clyde Avery- suggests setting a policy to not deploy all the key personnel out of the district at one time. Must leave some personnel at home to ensure response can be handled if there is a local event.

Dan Sink- need to work with the State EOC to improve or establish a procedure for standing up and standing down elements.

Matt Pitney- Communications Plan is available and needs to be sent to DPC for approval and implementation

Sherry Fagner- Need to work on developing a policy or SOG that provides for more safety officers within the current Task Force structure

Clyde Avery- The medical plan on scene had nothing to do with the responders- this needs to be noted and addressed during future deployments. Establish an SOP in advance.

Equipment Needs

Dan Sink- need to purchase a plotter for printing larger disposable maps on deployments.

Gary Horvath- purchase a standard book of Indiana county maps to send with deploying vehicles and personnel.

Ted Bombagetti- look into purchasing more printers so not all work is running through one or two larger printers.

Jim Lopez- suggests buying 3-4 ALS jump bags to assist with responder safety as many Task Force members are Paramedics or EMT's.

Henryville, Indiana Tornado

Indiana Task Force-1
Urban Search & Rescue Team Deployment

Executive Summary “Lessons Learned”



March 2nd to March 4th 2012

Prepared by:
Roger Tuchek
Jerry Nulliner
Justin Sparks

Henryville, Indiana Tornado Search and Rescue Deployment
State of Indiana

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
Success Stories

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Introduction

The National Weather Service and many local news channels provided forecasts as early as two days before the storms hit. Meteorologists at the National Weather Service's Storm Prediction Center said, *"The day would be one of a handful this year that warranted its highest risk level"*. The National Weather Service issued 297 tornado warnings and 388 severe thunderstorm warnings from Friday through early Saturday. Tornadoes ripped across much of the Midwest and killed an estimated 40 people in five states. There were 13 deaths in Indiana. The National Weather Service reported, *"The most severe damage appeared centered in small towns in southern Indiana around Henryville, Indiana"*. At 15:11 hours, an EF-4 tornado - the second-highest on the Fujita scale that measures tornadic force - packing 175 mph winds hit the town of Henryville, Indiana and stayed on the ground for more than 50 miles. Later analysis showed Henryville was subjected to a rare multi-vortex tornado. This weather phenomenon left behind a trail of shredded wood, sheet metal, insulation, bare foundations, crunched-up cars and families grieving for the 13 people that did not survive.




History of IN-TF1 and State of Indiana Deployment

The first time the State of Indiana, Department of Homeland Security (IDHS) called on Indiana Task Force-1 (IN-TF1) Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Team to respond to a disaster situation in the State of Indiana was April 1994 to Klondike, Indiana in Tippecanoe County. A tornado touched down in this area and caused significant damage. The next call was on November 6, 2005 where IN-TF1 was asked to respond to Evansville, Indiana after a tornado. This tornado resulted in 25 confirmed fatalities across the region. The deployment to Henryville, Indiana was the third time IDHS has requested IN-TF1 to respond.

IN-TF1 Operations, Friday, 2 March 2012

Activation

The initial news media reports from Henryville stated a school building took a direct hit and several children were missing and presumed trapped. Reports were being broadcast that every local resource from Clark County was engaged and they were requesting additional assets from Scott County, Washington County, Jefferson County, Floyd County, and the metro area of Louisville, Kentucky. However, getting assets from



Path of the multi-vortex, EF-4 Tornado, Henryville, Indiana

the surrounding jurisdictions proved to be difficult because the entire region was dealing with their own local weather related emergency response.

News media and IDHS reported that a large area was involved. It appeared to IDHS leadership that all responders were engaged in operations because of the widespread tornado damage and no additional resources were available for large scale Search and Rescue activities in collapsed buildings. IDHS advised local officials were overwhelmed and asked for IDHS help.

On Friday, March 2, at approximately 1628 hours, IDHS notified IN-TF1 leadership that Henryville, Indiana took a direct hit from a large and powerful tornado. IDHS asked IN-TF1 to alert the team but not deploy.

Notification

At approximately 16:30 hours Friday, March 2nd, IN-TF1 leadership requested the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Denver, Colorado Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Division to send out a message to all IN-TF1 Managers to respond to INTF-1 headquarters to prepare a Team Roster. Using the Denver MERS system is the standard notification method for IN-TF1 and all FEMA-USAR teams. The FEMA Denver MERS has the capability to send several types of messages to all 28 National FEMA USAR team members. The FEMA Denver MERS sent text messages, email messages and voice messages to all IN-TF1 managers' home phones, cell phones, email accounts and paging devices advising managers to respond to IN-TF1 Headquarters. Soon after this notification, managers started to arrive. At 1700 hours, IDHS notified IN-TF1 was officially activated to respond Henryville, Indiana. IN-TF1 members received the activation message from the Denver MERS to respond for immediate deployment.

IN-TF1 members found it difficult to get to Task Force Headquarters because of the Friday evening rush hour traffic. However, this did not slow the efforts to get the team out the door in a timely fashion.

Advanced Team Deployment

At 1700 hours, IN-TF1 leadership was told that a National Guard Helicopter was available to take two IN-TF1 team members to Henryville with IDHS Director Joseph Wainscott.

Task Force Leader-A (TFL-A) Warren Todd and Plans Team Manager-A (PTM-A) Troy Wymer flew down to Henryville on the helicopter. They departed Stout Field Indianapolis and landed on the Henryville High School baseball field. Flight time was 25 minutes for this 90 mile flight.



Indiana National Guard Helicopter,

The advantage of deploying an Advanced Team ahead of the full Task Force was first suggested in several after action reports as a result of previous IN-TF1 hurricane responses. Quickly getting eyes on the area of concern, meeting with the local Incident Commander (IC) and having the advantage of performing advanced planning before the arrival of the rest of the task force were seen as likely keys to establishing a foundation for current and future

operational success. Previous team meetings were held to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of sending an Advanced Team. Also, in those discussions, members of the Command Staff formulated a “boilerplate” design for who would go on an Advanced Team deployment. Discussions surrounding the “who goes” question also established the necessary justification of why this agreed upon configuration was best for establishing successful operations. The goal of an Advanced Team is to get “eyes on” the situation, warn the convoy of hazards, liaison with the local Incident Commander, explain our services and capabilities to the local IC, and then start the process of planning for operations while the rest of the task force travels to the scene.

Sending our IN-TF1 Advance Team by helicopter to Henryville was judged to be a tremendous success.

At 18:30 hours, a second Advanced Team was deployed in a vehicle ahead of the convoy. This Advanced Team was sent to assist TFL-A Todd and PTM-A Wymer. In addition, the Advanced Team sent by helicopter needed a vehicle in case they needed to travel to facilitate search planning or identify the area of greatest need. The effort of sending a second Advanced Team by ground in front of the convoy helped to prevent slowing down the arrival of the main contingent. This Advanced Team warned the convoy that Interstate 65 was closed due to heavy traffic and recommended the convoy take an alternate route.



IN-TF1 Team Buses

Advanced Teams should become a permanent fixture for local, state and federal Task Force deployments.

The main Task Force departed IN-TF1 Headquarters at 19:27 hours. There was a failure to have radios that were compatible with the State of Indiana trunked Mutual Aid radio system in all of the vehicles in the convoy. The convoy traveled 90 road miles. With stops, it took the convoy 2.5 hours, arriving on scene at 22:04 hours. Conversely, at approximately 18:15 hours, the IN-TF1 Advance Team interfaced with the local IC in Henryville Indiana. This helped to gain situational awareness and establish a relationship between the TFL, PTM and this local leader.



A map produced by the Local Incident Command

The TFL-A and PTM-A started the planning process and worked with the local IC to gather maps identifying areas having significant damage. The TFL-A notified the convoy of a hazard and was able to direct the convoy off of the backed-up, and now closed Interstate 65, onto South State Road

31. However, deficiencies were identified in the Advanced Team's communications capabilities. The local cellular system was not working or had limited capability. The TFL-A and PTM-A tried to use their personal cell phone to text messages, but this method proved unreliable. The Satellite Phone was also unreliable. Many local and state responder entities were using their own Satellite Phone to communicate. It was theorized that because dozens of local and state responders were using their own Satellite Phones, this overwhelmed the satellite system capability.

The news media was on scene and were reporting deaths associated with this tornado. The teams riding on the buses have satellite TV capabilities, to gain situational awareness, but were left guessing as to the impact. We hoped that our Advanced Team would be able to de-conflict this information, but without adequate communications capability, the team was left guessing.

The wealth of information the advanced team had when the convoy arrived, helped to better guide planning efforts, improve situational awareness and improved TFL decision making. However, having only 2 people go on the Advanced Team diminished the ability to gather information, de-conflict this information and communicate accurately it back to leadership and the team members.

Mobilization

IN-TF1 was told that the Base of Operations (BoO) was to be set up at Silver Creek High School, located seven miles south of Henryville High School. The entire convoy had to drive by the heavily damaged Henryville High School. This was the only route open in the area.

Upon arrival, at 22:04 hours, the Advance Team TFL-A Todd and the local IC identified



Henryville High School, after taking a direct hit from an EF-4 Tornado,
Saturday, March 3, 2012



IN-TF1 BoO, Silver Creek High School
Saturday, March 3, 2012

operational assignments. However communicating the information back the convoy was difficult. Some Task Force vehicles did not have radios capable of operating on the Statewide Mutual Aid channels. In addition, the Henryville Incident Command Post was operating on their local channels and was unable to establish communications with the Task Force on the Statewide Mutual Aid Radio system. Eventually, many hours later, communications capability was established over the Statewide Mutual Aid Trunked Radio System between the Task Force, the State of Indiana IMT and the

local IC.

At 22:06 hours, the IC requested the Structure Specialist and a Heavy Rigger off-load the bus and immediately start helping the local responders with operations at the Henryville High School. Team managers on the bus heard this request and responded. However, the local IC did not have a "State Radio" with mutual aid channels. A second radio was provided by a local Henryville responder which allowed the deployed Structure Specialists to communicate by proxy with the IC. As operations started, the Structure Specialist was asked by the local operators to have a Canine Handler and their Dog help search the Henryville High School. This request went up the chain to the IC, but never made it to the TFL. The canine was on the bus-the responders at Henryville High School watched the bus drive off into the night-never stopping to off load the dog. This was frustrating for the Structures Specialist and the local responders. It was blamed on the incompatible radios possessed by many of the local and state responders. As for the immediate response on Friday March 2nd, communications remained a challenge due to the lack of compatible frequencies and compatible radios.



Morning briefing
Silver Creek High School
Saturday, March 3, 2012

Inter-Team communications was assisted by the FEMA radios. FEMA-USAR leadership allowed the Team to use the Federal USAR Frequencies to communicate with in the team. This allowed the team to successfully communicate internally (within 1 mile because no repeaters were set up) while the thirty "State Radios" eventually allowed the team managers to communicate externally to the Local and State Incident Management Team members. In addition, leadership in Indianapolis was able to listen in and communicate with team management as required.

Friday night's operational intent was for IN-TF1 to immediately get to work and perform a wide area search with four Search Teams. The convoy arrived at Silver Creek High School where a BoO was established. Silver Creek High School had all essential utilities working and the building was not damaged. The team was spinning up to go to work.

At approximately 2300 hours, IN-TF1 Advanced Team met face to face with all IN-TF1 Command Staff at the BoO. The Advanced Team told the Command staff the local IC advised there were no missing people, all known residents were accounted for and no damaged structure had trapped people needing any immediate assistance. Because it was night time, and debris and live electrical wires were down throughout the county, In addition to leaking propane tanks, Task Force Leaders Warren Todd (TFL-A) and Jay Settergren (TFL-B) had the team stand down for the night.

IN-TF1 members were fed by the Salvation Army before going to bed.

The IC advised the Advanced Team to meet the State of Indiana IMT on Saturday morning, March 3rd, 0700 hours, at the Henryville Fire Station to formulate plans for a primary and

secondary search of all damaged structures and debris piles in Clark County.

IN-TF1 Operations, Saturday, 3 March 2012

In-Briefing

On Saturday, March 3rd, 0700 hours TFL's, PTM's and Safety Managers met the State of Indiana IMT and the local IC at the Henryville Fire Station. The State of Indiana IMT conducted the briefing. During the briefing, the following mission and objectives were prepared:



Many homes were found to only have the foundation remain after this EF-4 Tornado

Mission

Conduct primary and secondary search of all damaged structures in Clark County, Town of Henryville, Indiana.

Operational Objectives

- Provide for safety of first responders and public as we encounter them.
- Provide medical care for injured civilians.
- Provide medical care for entrapped civilians.
- Continue to work within the established incident command system.
- Continue to provide support as requested.
- Maintain communications with TFL and Local Incident Command systems
- Present a positive and professional image to the public-local, state and voluntary agencies

Priorities

- Perform SAR missions in Clark County and Town of Henryville, Indiana
- Maintain situational awareness and response readiness of all personnel

Rules of Engagement

The "Rules of Engagement" or, rules for entering a structure while conducting a primary and/or secondary search in Henryville, Indiana and Clark County were developed by the Indiana State Incident Management Team in conjunction with the local IC and Clark County Commissioners. These rules



IN-TF1 briefing, Henryville Fire Department, Saturday, March 3, 2012

**After Action Report/Improvement Plan
(AAR/IP)**

**2012 March Tornado Activation
IDHS**

were communicated to the team during each morning briefing as follows:

Primary Search

- Enter damaged structures only to determine if there are injured or entrapped.
- No forced entry to undamaged/unoccupied structures
- No Search Markings on undamaged structures.

Secondary Search

- Enter only if damaged and/or there is a possibility of someone being injured or entrapped.
- Use Search Markings on damaged structures.
- Use Search Stickers on undamaged structures and apply to a glass surface or mailbox.



IN-TF1 Searching a demolished home.
Saturday, March 3, 2012

Damaged Structures

- FEMA Search Markings are authorized for all damaged structures and vehicles.
- Report Natural Gas Leaks and/or Propane Odors, Fires, and Medical Casualties
- Notify the USAR Division Supervisor, who will contact either the Fire or EMS Division Supervisor to obtain further resources.
 - The Towns of Henryville and Marysville have natural gas while the remainder of Monroe Township and rural Clark County areas use Propane.
 - Stay out of low areas if you suspect a propane leak.

Operations



IN-TF1 searching Henryville High School.

The State of Indiana IMT and the local Clark County Commissioners did not have any information on missing or trapped people. However, they wanted IN-TF1 to search all debris piles to make sure there were no trapped victims in the rubble that could not be seen from a visual inspection. The IC and the IMT wanted all areas in Clark County searched by IN-TF1 members and IN-TF1 Canine to confirm no victims were buried in the rubble piles.

The State of Indiana asked that TFL Todd be re-assigned to local USAR Command Desk in the Command Center at the Henryville Fire Department. The planned

operations were configured to support a wide area search. TFL Jay Settergren and Search Team Manager (STM) Rick Taylor took charge of the search management and planning in conjunction with the Planning Team. STM Taylor worked with Rescue Team Manager (RTM) Harry Holbrook and Steve Frye to assemble four teams consisting of twelve (+2 or -2) INTF-1 members. Each team was led by a Search Team Member and Rescue Team Manager. Each team was assigned a canine handler. STM Taylor elevated the other Search Team members, Ryan Miller, Todd Macy and Aaron Bryant with individual STM responsibilities for each of the four individual search teams. In this configuration, each of the four team would have a STM and an RTM to provide oversight and control of the wide-area search operations. It was theorized four teams, managed appropriately, would be able to quickly search an assigned area-whether doing a primary or secondary search.

The weather for the day was sunny, cool with temperature ranging from 36 degrees to 51 degrees. Winds speed ranged from 8 mph to 17 mph, with scattered clouds during this operational period.

The entire team was given additional cold weather gear and briefed at 0800 hours. They proceeded to their individual assignments upon arrival in Henryville. Searching activities started at 09:20 hours.

The search squads encountered several structures with occupants on site and some damaged structures that were unoccupied. Members performed searches of the structures visually and with the assistance of the K9's. The residents were very welcoming and helpful in providing information on the status of their neighbors. This was critical information in assisting to determine that everyone in the search area was accounted for. The residents reported no needs for assistance and no knowledge of any missing persons.



IN-TF1 Searching a demolished home.
Saturday, March 3, 2012

The area searched in the Town of Henryville was primarily one home every 2 acres. Outside of Henryville, the area searched was mostly a rural residential area, typically one residence per 10 acres. Some homes were situated 50-100 yards off the road and some as far as a ½ mile off the roadway.

The National Weather Service reported this tornado left path of destruction for 49 miles. In Clark County, most homes in the direct path of the tornado were completely blown off their foundations. Very little property remained to be recovered by the owners. The width of the tornado damage seen in Clark County was 100-300 yards wide. Homes outside this range were

heavily damaged but still standing. Homes within this area were completely leveled.



IN-TF1 finding only a foundation and propane tank.
Saturday, March 4, 2012

IN-TF1 searched debris piles and structures as instructed. Members appropriately marked buildings with either the USAR Search Stickers or Orange Spray Paint. In Henryville, at approximately 11:20 hours, Search Squad 3 and 4 came upon a home in which a female, approximately 55 years old, had sustained injured ribs. The patient was unable to leave her house as it had been significantly shifted from its foundation preventing her from leaving. Rescue specialists made contact and determined the need for medical evaluation. Doctor O'Donnell (Medical Team Mgr) performed an assessment and found her injuries were suspicious for

fractured ribs. Furthermore, she had severe nausea, vomiting and diarrhea leading up to the tornado causing her to be severely dehydrated. The decision was made to extricate the patient and arrange ALS transportation to a local hospital. A window was removed to extricate the patient. Once extricated, care was handed off to Rural Metro ambulance for transportation. Further search activities were conducted in the Town of Henryville. Two civilians suffering from minor lacerations were assessed and treated by the medical team. There were no injuries to Task Force Members at the end of the day.

The team was fed by the Salvation Army that night, and slept indoors in the gymnasium of the Silver Creek High School.

All night search missions were scrapped due to debris causing tripping hazards, live wires and security concerns.

IN-TF1 Operations, Saturday, 4 March 2012

In-Briefing

On Saturday, March 4th, 0700 hours TFL's, PTM's and Safety Managers meet the local IC at the Henryville Fire Station. The State of Indiana IMT was on scene and they conducted the briefing. During the briefing, the following mission and objectives were prepared:



Base of a Mobile Home struck in a tree. Saturday, March 4, 2012

Mission:

Conduct primary and secondary search of all damaged structures in Clark County, Town of Henryville, Indiana.

Operational Objectives

- Provide for safety of first responders and public as we encounter them.
- Provide medical care for injured civilians.
- Provide medical care for entrapped civilians.
- Continue to work within the established incident command system.
- Continue to provide support as requested.
- Maintain communications with TFL and Local Incident Command systems
- Present a positive and professional image to the public-local, state and voluntary agencies



IN-TF1 inspecting a demolished home.
Saturday, March 3, 2012

Priorities

- Perform SAR missions in Clark County and Town of Henryville, Indiana
- Maintain situational awareness and response readiness of all personnel

Rules of Engagement

The “Rules of Engagement” or, rules for entering a structure while conducting a primary and/or secondary search in Henryville, Indiana and Clark County were developed by the Indiana State Incident Management Team in conjunction with the local IC and Clark County Commissioners. These rules were communicated to the team during each morning briefing as follows:

Primary Search

- Enter damaged structures only to determine if there are injured or entrapped.
- No forced entry to undamaged/unoccupied structures
- No Search Markings on undamaged structures.

Secondary Search

- Enter only if damaged and/or there is a possibility of someone being injured or entrapped.



Front/Main Entrance of Henryville High School,
Saturday, March 3, 2012



Henryville High School, Saturday, March 3, 2012

- Use Search Markings on damaged structures.
- Use Search Stickers on undamaged structures and apply to a glass surface or mailbox.

Damaged Structures

- FEMA Search Markings are authorized for all damaged structures and vehicles.
- Report Natural Gas Leaks and/or Propane Odors, Fires, and Medical Casualties
- Notify the USAR Division Supervisor, who will contact either the Fire or EMS Division Supervisor to obtain further resources.
 - The Towns of Henryville and Marysville have natural gas while the remainder of Monroe Township and rural Clark County areas use Propane.
- Stay out of low areas if you suspect a propane leak.

Operations

Basic operations and “Rules of Engagement” were identical to the previous day’s operations. TFL Jay Settergren, STM Rick Taylor and PTM Troy Wymer took charge of the wide area search management and planning. TFL Settergren and PTM Troy Wymer communicated the “Rules of Engagement” for this operational period. STM Taylor worked with PTM Wymer and the two Rescue Team Managers to assemble four teams consisting of twelve (+2 or -2) INTF-1 members. Each team was assigned a canine handler.

The entire team was briefed at 0800 hours. Searching started at 09:30 hours.

The weather for the day was partly cloudy, cool with temperature ranging from 28 degrees to 39 degrees. At 0900, light snow began to fall. Winds speed ranged from 5 mph to 15 mph.

The Medical Team Manager Strachan addressed a minor laceration to the paw pad of one of the canines. The canine was cleared by Dr. Strachan and the Handler for operations that day.

Two search teams were deployed to an area in the Town of Henryville and two teams were deployed to a rural area northeast of Henryville in rural Clark County. This deployment was following along the path of the tornado. The structures in this area were significantly damaged or completely destroyed. The IC wanted all of this area to be searched by IN-TF1 canines to confirm no victims were missed.

IN-TF1 began wide area search operations covering the entire tornado path through Henryville. Members performed searches of the structures visually and with the assistance of the canines. Contact was made with the residents encountered. IN-TF1 member’s intent was to try and



Several destroyed homes and the debris field in rural Clark County, Saturday, March 3, 2012

identify any people that were unaccounted for and to assess if there were any unmet needs these residents may have had.

TFL Settergren made arrangements to have a Fire Engine go to a rally point and meet the team to do a gross de-con on the boots of searchers- once they were done with their search efforts. No injuries were reported during this effort and personnel accountability was checked and verified.

The Planning Team and Logistics Team were starting the de-mob

process because IN-TF1 cleared the last search area. However, the IC called and asked the TFL to return to the command post to meet with the Henryville Fire Chief.

During this meeting, TFL Settergren went through the all of the maps to determine if the team covered all the areas the IC wanted the Team to check. It was determined that there was a small area in the far western part of Clark County that the IC wanted IN-TF1 to check. TFL Settergren used the IN-TF1 command vehicle and did a windshield survey of this area.



Destroyed home in rural Clark County, Saturday, March 3, 2012

The remaining team members were appropriately de-coned and sent back to the BoO to document their activities, help break down equipment and load the trucks.

After about an hour of doing the windshield survey in the small are of the county, TFL Settergren reported back to the IC his findings. TFL Settergren and the IC determined that all of the areas were covered by IN-TF1 in all the areas the IC wanted the team to search. TFL Settergren returned to the Command Post and had one finial meeting with TFL Todd and the local IC. As a result, IN-TF1 was released to finish the de-mob process and return to Indianapolis. IN-TF1 members loaded the trucks and the Plans Team completed the

demobilization paperwork. Copies of this paperwork were email and dropped off at the command post.

Demobilization

At 1400 hours 4 March 2012, the Henryville Incident Command officially notified IN-TF1 that they were being demobilized. IN-TF1 Plan Team completed the demobilization check out paperwork and departed Henryville. IN-TF1 arrived in Indianapolis at 1700 hours.



Organizational Effectiveness

Only the foundation remains, Henryville, Indiana
Saturday, March 3, 2012

- FEMA Communicator and Denver MERS worked very well notifying the team.
- The Advance Team Deployment by helicopter was a tremendous success. Getting an Advanced Team on scene quickly, getting eyes on the area of concern, meeting with the local Incident Commander (IC) and having the advantage of planning before the arrival of the rest of the Task Force was key to establishing a foundation for success. Having the additional advantage of sending an Advance Team by helicopter to Henryville was judged to be a tremendous success! (Emphasis added) The wealth of information the Advanced Team had when the convoy arrived, helped to better guide planning efforts. This effort improve situational awareness, warned the convoy of hazards, liaison with the local Incident Commander, explained our services and capabilities to the local IC, started the map making efforts, and improved TFL decision making.
- Overall the leadership was very good. However, we did have a TFL get pulled into the USAR desk of the IMT, which caused them to drift out of their lane.
- Everyone worked well as a team. Nobody argued about assignments or tasks.



- Logistics was very responsive to members needs and pitched in to help anytime there was a request. Everyone stepped up and helped each other out. Logistics got packed and loaded in record time. Getting the trucks loaded, the team assembled and out the door in 3 hours, as well as arriving on-scene in 2.5 hours after leaving Indianapolis, is a record time. According to Program Manager, Chief Bill Brown, "this quick response, getting out the door, getting on scene, has never been done by a FEMA-USAR team this quick". In fact, Chief Brown received a congratulatory call from FEMA-USAR Chief Fred

Endocrat regarding the speed at which the team was loaded, on-scene and prepared for operations.

- Safety made sure the team stayed safe and returned home in the same condition as we arrived.
- The Silver Creek High School made a very good BoO. The Advance Team was responsible for getting this facility and it was in a perfect location. The school principal and the custodial staff were very helpful and accommodating.
- The Salvation Army kept team members fed with hot food and were accommodating.
- The Federal FEMA Radios helped to maintain accountability of members and facilitated in better safety and management of the teams search efforts. FEMA radios were used on USAR B-3, B-5, B-7 & B-10 for short range (no repeater) communication among squads. IN-TF1 was deployed by the State of Indiana as a Type 1 (80 Person) team with only 30 State of Indiana Radios. Upon arrival of the Advanced Team, communications capabilities were immediately identified as a significant challenge. FEMA assisted IN-TF1 during operations by allowing the use of the Federal radios and frequencies to support “boots on the ground”. The federal radios helped communicate to the search & rescue team members in many different divisions. By allowing IN-TF1 to use these Federal radios and frequencies, managers were able to use the State radios to talk to the IC and USAR Desk while using the other federal radios to monitor and talk to the “boots on the ground”. This is important during a wide area search operations because hazards are abundant; safety and accountability are always a challenge.
- The Statewide 800 megahertz radio system worked very well for this deployment. State channel “ST SW-MA1” was used. Both systems work well in helping leadership maintain accountability and safety. It would be advantageous to establish a statewide channel and talkgroup for in-state deployments that is pre-approved by all parties concerned.
- The Bus Contractor, Sodrel had a very quick response and the buses arrived one hour after we called.
- There were no equipment failures.
- Pre-Rostering the team on a monthly basis helped to get the team out the door in a timely fashion.



IN-TF1 “Firsts”

This deployment marks a number of “firsts” for IN-TF1.

- First using the FEMA Communicator to notify the team of a State deployment.
- First time using an Indiana National Guard Helicopter to transport Advance Team members.
- First interaction with the Indiana Excise Police as an escort for the convoy.
- First time being led by the State of Indiana, District 5 Incident Management Team.
- First time using the new Satellite Internet system.
- First Type I Team deployment since Hurricane Ike in 2008.
- First time we had a TFL pulled into the IMAT to operate and manage the USAR desk

Before



After



Recommendations/ Lessons Learned

1. Civilian Liability and Workman's Compensation Coverage on State and Local Deployments

Discussion

Civilian Personnel in all positions are not afforded the same liability and Workman's Compensation Coverage on State and Local Deployments as on Federal Deployments. The lack of coverage has been identified, and for many years, it is still unresolved with clarity. If IN-TF1 is requested as a "Mobile Support Unit" by the State of Indiana, (ie: a State Asset) civilian employees are **NOT** covered at all. However, if the team is requested as a "Federal Asset" through the State of Indiana or IDHS, then coverage is identical to the coverage for any and all FEMA Federal deployments. The likelihood and timing required for the team to be a labeled as a "Federal Asset" in a State of Indiana or even the City of Indianapolis/Marion County disaster is unrealistic. If the State, IDHS or the City requests the Task Force to deploy for an event, there is no coverage for civilian personnel; and no current discussions to address the topic.

Liability coverage and Workman's Compensation coverage should be extended equally to all civilians in all positions due to the critical rolls they provide to the team:

- Structural Specialists
- Doctors
- K-9 Handlers
- Tech Search
- Communications
- Logistics
- Hazardous Material Specialists

The team must have civilians in order to exist. The State of Indiana and the Indiana Department of Homeland Security **MUST** see this as a major priority and push both Local and State leaders to provide this coverage. This is the right thing to do, if not for the existence of the team and future recruitment.

We owe it to our Civilians who risk their professional careers, and their lives, to allow IN-TF1 to function. The State of Indiana, IDHS and the City of Indianapolis/Marion County must provide them coverage in the same manner and scope as is done for FEMA/Federal deployments. IDHS must address this in the Legislature to rectify the disparity. If not, this issue could limit the response capability of IN-TF1 in the State of Indiana and at home in Indianapolis.



Recommendation

Much research, examples of other States coverage, and other legal options have been identified and presented over the years on this topic. IDHS, City Leaders and Team Leadership need to push forward and meet with the State Legislature, City-County Council members, Supporting Agency Representatives, and professional trade organizations to explain the issue and gain support. At the same time, a meeting with State and City Homeland Security leadership is needed to finally resolve this disparity. A group of civilians should be assembled to assist in this task. We have been dealing with this issue for years, now is the time to push on this topic due to the recent events and the resources provided.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- Immediately start discussions with the both State IDHS and City of Indianapolis to reach a resolution.

FEMA Program Office:

- Not applicable


Referred to:

State Department of Homeland Security	X	
City of Indianapolis Department of Homeland Security		X
FEMA Program Office		
IN-TF1 Administration	X	
IN-TF1 Working Group	X	Establish a working group
All of the Above		
Others as specified	X	IN-TF1 Team Managers with Civilians

2. Requesting of Additional Resources while at a incident site by a working team member

Discussion

While the Structures Specialist was at Henryville High School on Friday, March 2nd, working with the IC to provide structural evaluations, the IC determined that he needed additional K-9 and Rescue resources to complete both primary and secondary searches of the entire building. The site had limited lighting, crews present were exhausted, without proper resources, and not knowing for sure what had been accomplished prior to their



arrival, the IC was in need of help. Knowing IN-TF1 capabilities and coupled with his lack of communications to the Command Post, only 1 mile away, he requested that the IN-TF1 Structural Specialist (Cook) put in said request. Communicating through the TFL, and other Advanced Team members, the request for 2 additional K-9s and 2 Rescue Squads was placed.



The frustrating part to this situation, was not more than 15 minutes prior, the entire IN-TF1 Convoy had just driven by on the street in front of the high school. They stopped, and dropped off a second Structural Specialist and a Heavy Rigger before proceeding to the BoO-15 minutes farther south.

After several radio communications between the ESF-9 desks in Indianapolis trying to identify chain of authorization at the Command Post, (CP) our Advanced Team members had been working with the CP for several hours. Apparently the ESF-9 desk did not have communications capability, and TFL's were trying to relay messages. An hour, if not two had elapsed. Finally, the Operations Sections Chief at the CP drove down with 2 additional K-9's to the incident site. Additional manpower never arrived. With the previous resources (1 K-9 – which was not qualified, and 6 rescue personnel) and the additional resources (2 additional K-9's, 2 Structural Specialists, and a Heavy Rigger) the task was completed. A more efficient method to obtain permission and to deploy resources when requested should be established. The question also comes up as to whether separate resources should be pulled away from the entire Team. In this situation the Advanced Team was approached by the CP of the need for Structural Specialist and Heavy Rigger at the School, and that request was filled without approval for the State ESF-9 desk. Were these resources intended to be separate or an extension of the entire Team? If another mission required the entire Task Force could they full fill that mission with the resources at another location? How many other resources can be parceled out before the Team is no longer a resource?

Recommendation

Assemble a working group from a cross section of managers to formulate a policy on how to handle this issue.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- 1 year

FEMA Program Office:

- Not applicable

Referred to:

State Department of Homeland Security

City of Indianapolis Department of
Homeland
Security

FEMA Program Office

IN-TF1 Administration

X

IN-TF1 Working Group

X

All of the Above

Others as specified

X TFL's



3. Check In Process and “Getting out the Door” Challenges

Discussion

During most deployments, especially “no notice” deployments, the pace, the amount of tasks needing to be accomplished, personnel responsibility coupled with limited space, and distance between the cache site and HQ’s creates the following challenges:

- Equipment being left behind
- Members needing to check equipment being loaded
- Personnel not getting checked in and not obtaining health evaluations
- Communication Issues
- Too much noise and perceived chaos
- Travel distance between HQ and Warehouse issues
- Parking issues
- Not enough room for Command Staff and support personnel to function properly
 - HQ and assembly room are too congested and not adequate in size



Although we have a Mobilization Manual to provide the “what to do”, often there is so much to be done that additional people are needed to get all the tasks accomplished. Additional space, better flow, and a more organized system needs to be established to efficiently and effectively accomplish mission critical tasks. After check-in, there are several members who could be put to use by delegating tasks from their own team managers. (ie: Haz-Mat checking monitors, Structures Specialist running check in desks,

etc) .

Recommendation

Rethink the check in process. Move the check-in to the Warehouse/Cache Site or to the Lannigan Center-except for the Command Staff and Managers who would continue to organize and function out of the HQ Building. One building to house all operations under one roof, preferably with ample parking in a secured perimeter is preferred.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- 3-6 months

FEMA Program Office:

- Not applicable

Referred to:

State Department of Homeland Security

City of Indianapolis Department of
Homeland Security
FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration
IN-TF1 Working Group
All of the Above
Others as specified



X

X

X Logistics

4. Helicopter Operations

Discussion

Many years ago, IN-TF1 team members have had the opportunity to train with the Indiana Air National Guard on helicopter operations. Currently, helicopter training has been facilitated by the Indiana State Police. This has allowed task force members “hands on” experience with working around and traveling aboard helicopters. As a result of this training, when air operations were being considered, personnel were versed in what needed to be done to get members airborne. While this training is light years beyond anything we have done before, it has been limited to two airframes, (Bell Jet Ranger and the UH-60 Blackhawk) and limited types of search and rescue operations.

Recommendation

First and foremost continue training the membership on air operations but include the other types of airframes (CH-47, CH-53, etc) that we could encounter while deployed. These examples can be visual in nature; as getting this equipment to training would be

difficult at best. Or, tailor training schedules around certain events within Indianapolis that might bring such aircraft to the Indianapolis area. For helicopter operations, IN-TF1 must develop operational assignments for an Advance Team.

Time Frame

IN-TF1

- **3-6 months**
- Consider additional training on various airframes and types of tactical assignments in the coming year;
- Development of roles and responsibilities of an Advanced Team within the concept of air operations.

FEMA Program Office:

- Not applicable

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration
IN-TF1 Working Group

- X (For updating future training programs)
- X (For developing and agenda and

assignments)

All of the Above
Others as specified

5. Two Hour Response for State of Indiana Requests

Discussion

IN-TF1 management asserts the team can respond to any State of Indiana request and be on the road within two hours. Leadership has told members this is to be an expected minimum. Based on this recent deployment, the “two hour response” is unrealistic. For example, it took 3 hours to fuel and load up the trucks. Some equipment had been left behind. Re-working the load plan by not taking the Black Bags may help. However, hurrying caused mistakes and increases the chance for accidents and injuries. We should not assert the team can do something when in reality; it cannot and should not be done.



Recommendation

Make the needed adjustments in the load policy for state deployments and consider not

taking the black bags. Discussions need to commence regarding how to best deploy quickly anywhere in the State of Indiana. For example, can we load and deploy “essential equipment” to get the team quickly into theater with basic tools, then follow up with additional semi’s bringing equipment in theater-hours later-building additional capability and capacity in stages?

Time Frame

IN-TF1

- Consider various load plans, 1 year
- Continue discussions on how to deploy within 2 hours, 1 year

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office	
IN-TF1 Administration	X
IN-TF1 Working Group	X
All of the Above	
Others as specified	X (Logistics)

6. Agenda for Advanced Team and 2nd Advanced Team

Discussion

Advanced Team members must have a specific mission identified, and once on scene, focus on completing mission critical tasks. An agenda needs to be developed to guide efforts. There is intense time pressure to accomplish certain objectives on a yet to be developed agenda. The Advance Teams accomplishments must be measured and benchmarks must be set otherwise the initiative and chances for success will be lost. The mission will fail if members freelance and lose focus. In addition, if the Advance Team gets pulled into other tasks- as what happened in Henryville- then the advantage of having an Advanced Team is lost. Specific agenda, individualized assignments, goals, objectives, milestones and benchmarks must be developed to prevent a loss of focus and “mission creep”.



Recommendation

The Advanced Team is new to IN-TF1 operations. The success of the Henryville deployment justifies the continuation of deploying an Advance Team ahead of the main convoy. However, IN-TF1 must develop an agenda and specific assignments for each

member in the Advance Team. They were tremendously successful in this deployment, but as with many “firsts”, an agenda needs to be identified and better organizational and operational methods need to be in place, which will spawn other recommendations for further procedure and policy refinement.



A deficiency identified is the need for two (2) “Go Boxes” loaded. Members on the Advance Teams need to discuss what items must go in these “Go-Boxes.” One (1) or two (2) vehicles are needed to transport the Advanced Teams members to the disaster scene. Management must identify the appropriate vehicles capable of supporting all of the Advance Teams yet to be identified needs and requirements.

One criticism from the Advance Team regarding the Helicopter-there was additional seats in the helicopter. IN- TF1 would have liked to have filled these empty seats with additional members or additional equipment. The Advanced Team members were told by IDHS to bring only one (1) small backpack-nothing else. With unoccupied seats, more members (Search Dog) could have been put to work immediately. This would be helpful and the capability to bring more personnel and equipment would enhance the Advance Teams capabilities.

Time Frame

IN-TF1

- Development of a mission, agenda, roles, responsibilities, benchmarks, policy, procedures and milestones for an Advanced Team. 3 – 6 months Development of a “go box” and vehicle for use by the Advanced Team. 3 – 6 months

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration

IN-TF1 Working Group
All of the Above
Others as specified

X (For Developing specific agenda, individualized assignments, goals, objectives, milestones and benchmarks and training programs)

X

X (TFL, Plans, TSS, TIS, for developing vehicle assignments and logistical requirements)

7. Advanced Team “Go Box” and Vehicle GPS

Discussion

The Advance Teams did not have a “go box” to facilitate their needs. Whether they are transported by helicopter or in a vehicle, communications by cell phone, satellite phone and radio was is essential. In the Henryville Deployment, all forms of communication were cut off when the team entered the air space of the disaster zone. In addition to a “go box”, dedicated vehicle based GPS units and a handheld GPS unit needs to go with the Advance Team. The dedicated vehicle based GPS will help the Advance Team arrive using the shortest and fastest route possible. The Advanced Team needs to be made aware of information about traffic jams prior to running into any potential the blockage. This vehicle based unit may help give early warning of traffic issues, but also has the capability of re-routing the members to open roadways. While enroute to the disaster site, the Advanced Team can GPS mark locations of hazards such as downed lines, bridges out, or debris on the roadway. Once on scene, the Advance Team can use the GPS to mark potential victim locations and other areas of concern that need immediate attention. These GPS coordinates can be relayed back to the team so logistics and manpower can prepare.

Recommendation

Develop a “go box” for the Advanced Team. It must facilitate transportation by helicopter or in a vehicle. All forms of communications are necessary-cell phone, satellite phone, internet hot spot, computer and radios. The dedicated vehicle should have a vehicle GPS unit and a handheld GPS unit.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:
3 months

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration
IN-TF1 Working Group
All of the Above
Others as specified

X (Task Force Leaders and Team Managers)

X (TFL, Plans, Search, Communications, Logistics)

8. Inclement Weather Documentation Capabilities

Discussion

Write in the rain note books are needed for the field operators. Many of the team member’s notes got wet due to rain, snow or dew. When trying to keep notes and/or GPS information and the paper is wet, it makes it difficult to write accurate information

down and get back to the TIS.

Recommendation

Work with logistics and team managers to obtain and then distribute adequate numbers of wet weather writable tablets. Inventory has a current supply. Logistics need to ensure that adequate quantities are available for use.



Time Frame

IN-TF1:

Immediate; these items are already a part of our supplies. Acquisition of additional "Write-in-Rain" notebooks as needed.

Referred to:

- FEMA Program Office
- IN-TF1 Administration
- IN-TF1 Working Group
- All of the Above
- Others as specified

X

X (Task Force Leaders and Team Managers)

9. Intelligence / Information Dissemination

Discussion

During this deployment, the flow of current intelligence was not adequately distributed to all members. Throughout the deployment there was a lack of causality and missing person's information to provide operation guidance.

Recommendation

Ensure the establishment of the status board or computer, big screen TV scrolling Web EOC information in BoO early in the deployment. Situational intelligence places a large role in overall taskforce operational understanding and direction. Using the SharePoint or Hotmail account and allow access to information by team members deployed.



Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- Immediate – This can be reinforced through training

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration

IN-TF1 Working Group
**X Logistics,
Planning, and
Communications teams.**
All of the Above
Others as specified



10. Medical Check-In

Discussion

There was some confusion between medical personnel on whether we would be putting wristbands on those who have been checked in. This was quickly resolved. Wristbands should be a mandatory part of check-in to identify those who have been checked in medically. Furthermore, the Medical Team Mangers should specifically detail one medical specialist per check-in section to obtain vitals. There were times where we could not find one.

Recommendation

In summary, upon arrival to Task Force HQ, each MD should be assigned a medical specialist to begin an efficient medical check in that includes marking those who have been checked in.

Time Frame

IN-TF1

- Immediate: This change can be implemented without delay.

FEMA Program Office

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration
IN-TF1 Working Group
All of the Above

X
X Medical Division

Others as specified

11. Force Protection for State of Indiana Deployments

Discussion

Force Protection seems to be an issue we have never overcome. During operations in rural

Clark County on Saturday, team members came across property owners arming themselves with shotguns, handguns and rifles and threatening anyone approaching their property. Because homes, and the property inside these homes, were spread out over miles, it was assumed homeowners were trying to prevent strangers from looting. It was reported that armed residents were angry at neighbors, who they knew and did not like before the disaster, being on their property. It was described as a “Hatfield’s and McCoy’s” scenario. On the State Mutual Aid radio channels, PTM Wymer called for the Indiana State Police to assist and provide protection for Task Force members. At least 10 minutes after this call for assistance was made, the Indiana State Police did not show up. A second call was radioed to Command by PTM Wymer, and with the help of TFL Todd sitting at the USAR desk, face-to-face contact was made and this initiated the State Police command to finally get several troopers on scene. Waiting for the State Police to show up was described as very tense and uncertain time for those involved. This situation could have been prevented, and the risk and threat mitigated if the Task Force took their own Force Protection (IMPD) with them on State Deployments. It is agreed by leadership that using unfamiliar law enforcement personnel is not optimal



as these entities do not know the language spoken by, and operations of, a USAR Task Force. In addition, unfamiliar LE officers tend to lose focus and drift off to other duties. This was the case on Friday night when we were given Indiana Excise Police to escort the Task Force to Henryville. Excise Police showed up at Task Force HQ in an unmarked pick-up truck, with minimal emergency lighting. Once the Task Force arrived at Silver Creek High School, the Excise Police faded away without any notification.

On Saturday, the Task Force had another need for Force Protection. In a case of misunderstanding, the Indiana State Police PIO’s were telling people to go to Silver Creek High School to sign up to be a volunteer. This put the Task Force and all of the equipment at risk because people were going in unlocked doors of the school and wandering around the school looking for the “Volunteer desk”. They were checking out INTF-1 trucks, our personal gear and the sensitive equipment inside the school. It took Indiana State Police 45 minutes to respond to the school and help corral all of the

wandering volunteers.

INTF-1 will never have a BoO facility that is totally secure. The Team accepts a certain level of risk dependant on the circumstances. However, current trends require mitigation steps be taken to protect the responders. Operations will be jeopardized if team members or equipment are lost because of theft or attacks. Synchronizing security programs and operations into comprehensive defensive measures are required to protect personnel, information, and critical resources against known and unknown threats and possible attacks. These steps must be supported by the synchronization of doctrine, training, operations, intelligence, and resources. In only this way will force protection will be a force multiplier that has the capability to reduce injuries, minimize loss of life, minimize the loss of critical assets, keep all assets, people and stuff safe.

Recommendation

Reach out to IMPD Leadership and invite the Event Response Group (ERG) to train with IN-TF1. IMPD Leadership has said they would be willing to provide force protection to IN-TF1, and deploy with the team on State and Federal deployments, however, they have not been asked. Currently in the IMPD Emergency Operations Manual, the Event Response Group is identified as the group responsible for providing Force Protection services to other first responder agencies. This is long overdue. A formal letter from IN-TF1 leadership will start the discussions on how to formulate policies and procedures for IMPD to provide Force Protection. Pre-Planning has already taken place in regards to this proposal. IMPD just needs the invitation.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- Reach out and start discussions with IMPD on how to provide Force Protection to IN-TF1.

FEMA Program Office:

- Not applicable

Referred to:

State Department of Homeland Security	
City of Indianapolis Department of Homeland Security	X
FEMA Program Office	
IN-TF1 Administration	X
IN-TF1 Working Group	X
All of the Above	
Others as specified	X IMPD

12. Compatible Radios in Semi-Trucks

Discussion

This was a State deployment and some of the semi's do not have State radios. If the semi's have radios, those radios did not have frequencies compatible with the State of Indiana Mutual Aid radio system.

Recommendation

Ensure all vehicles have identical communications capabilities.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- Immediate

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office
IN-TF1 Administration
IN-TF1 Working Group
All of the Above
Others as specified

X Communications

13. Check-in at TF HQ Flow

Discussion

The flow inside of IN-TF1 Headquarters was chaotic. A different method of signing in members and getting them medically cleared for a no-notice deployment needs to be found. Many of the logistics personnel never signed in. Medical checks were not performed on all members deploying. Plans Team management and the Rescue Team management needed to replace non-deployable people because of last minute issues that made these people unable to respond. Having 80 people milling around the Task Force Headquarters made for an unorganized work area.



Recommendation

Discussions have taken place regarding this issue. Steps are being taken to resolve this issue in the short term, but long term solutions need to be formulated and implemented.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- 3-6 months

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office

IN-TF1 Administration X

IN-TF1 Working Group X

All of the Above

Others as specified



14. IDHS Standardized Method for Notification and Documentation

Discussion

The team was administratively delayed getting out the door because there is no standardized method in place to have the State of Indiana notify the team and quickly produce the necessary signed documentation to support the request. IN-TF1 is local and State asset as needed, but no standardized method for notification is in place.

Recommendation

IN-TF1 works within a standardized “Federal Template”. This has been time and experience tested for all deployments in the USAR System. IDHS should not dictate how IN-TF1 configures our team and how we deployment. The Federal Template is in place because it works. Deviating from a proven design places members and the mission in jeopardy.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:

- 6 months

Referred to:

FEMA Program Office

IN-TF1 Administration X

IN-TF1 Working Group X

All of the Above

Others as specified X IDHS

15. Additional Radios from State of Indiana with Mutual Aid Channels:

Discussion

Having 30 State radios is not enough for a State of Indiana deployment. It was difficult to manage the team with only enough radios for the managers. This was a wide area search, in a geographical area where management of personnel and accountability of personnel by line-of-sight was not available.



Recommendation

The Task Force does not have enough State Radios with the Mutual Aid Radio Channels. To maintain accountability and provide for better management of assets not in immediate view, having additional State radios would have mitigated accountability issues, reduced hazards associated with wide area search operations and improve the safety and management of the team.

Time Frame

IN-TF1:


- 6 months

Referred to:


FEMA Program Office	
IN-TF1 Administration	X
IN-TF1 Working Group	X Communications
All of the Above	
Others as specified	

MAPS

Garmin Tracks showing IN-TF1 coverage.



Garmin Tracks showing IN-TF1 coverage.



Initial Maps developed on March 02 and 03, 2012

